The Academy Awards – Does Anybody Really Know What Time it is?
February 23, 2012
It really has to be noted that with the proliferation of cable, as well as the televising of so many of the essential awards shows which run up to the Academy Awards show, including the Golden Globes et al., as well as the increase in information about film and awards available both on the web and from other sources, it seems less and less relevant to watch the Academy Awards.
First, historically, it seems that usually the Directors Guild, the Writers Guild, as well as the Foreign Press, often have made much better decisions in the past about films, than has the Academy. While that would be the subject for a longer piece than this, suffice it to say that in 1980, the Academy failed to honor “Raging Bull” as best film, even though everyone now agrees it is not only the best film of that year, but probably one of the best films of any year ever made. Many other such silly errors can be pointed out.
Second, the show is long, boring and self-indulgent.
Third, beginning perhaps with the time long ago when I was just a wee lad when Marlon Brando sent a tiny woman with a native american feather to accept his award for best actor for his role in The Godfather in the early 1970s, the Awards seem to have become a place for secular proselytizing about all sorts of weirdly held political beliefs by our actors, directors and other entertainers.
For these, we have one basic thought: Singers should sing, Actors should act, Directors should direct, and none of you should discuss politics or religion. Especially on our Academy Awards night. Just say Thank You, be Charming, and get on your way to the Backstage Party. Please.
If we hear one more ridiculous political wacko speech about the native americans, the environment, how bad this or that President is, how we should “Give Peace a Chance,” etc., ad nauseum, well, none of us really disagree with your IDEALISTIC IDEAS, it’s just that we don’t really want to hear them, see?
We want to be ENTERTAINED!!!
Which brings us to last years’ interminable and boring show, featuring the lovely, but incredibly boring Anne Hathaway, and another fellow whose name I have completely forgotten, his hosting duties were so non-memorable.
If you are to assume a nom-de-plume on the order of Shakespeare’s lovely wife, doth it not behoove thee to speak at least in decasyllabic metre, or at least an English accent, while hosting the Academy Awards? For goodness sakes, study the Kings Speech, Colin Firth and Helen Mirren!!! They understand the value of Public Speaking!!!
If you do not speak well in public, it tends to grate upon us after the second or third painful hour. Like a grate carving up cheese. Painfully.
Which brings us to Billy Crystal.
Who is funny. Who is from New York. Who for his birthday, decided to go train in spring with his beloved New Yawk Yankees.
Now this guy is funny, entertaining, and yes, maybe my wife and family might want to sit down with him for a couple of hours and if he’s making the jokes, maybe we’ll even tolerate a few silly speeches.
God bless Billy Crystal, God Bless the Academy Awards.
There’s no Business like Show Business.
Enjoy.
LIN-AMENT. LIN FIRST HARVARD GRAD TO PLAY FOR NY KNICKS SINCE 1953-54
February 16, 2012
Jeremy Lin is only the 3d player from Harvard to play in the NBA.
He was a terrific player not only at Harvard, but in the Ivies. He established a line of records unmatched in Ivy League history, and along the way, the Harvard basketball team, which had never amounted to a bucket of warm spit until Lin and Coach Amaker arrived, found its way to the Ivy League title and the NCAA tournament.
My sons and I watched these guys, led by Lin, play a ferocious contest in the Palestra against their arch-rivals Penn in 2010, which was a double overtime contest, and as Harvard finally won, largely due to the intensity and refusal to lose of Lin, who kept penetrating, dishing off, shooting jumpers, and doing whatever it took to win, it seemed like a passing of the guard.

The Daily Pennsylvanian made pun of Lin's name back in 2009 at Penn, showing once again Philly was three years ahead of NYC media.
So it’s no secret why Lin is the 2d best player on the knicks in win shares per 48 minutes at .187 after Tyson Chandler’s .248; or why his PER approaching 25 leads the team. Lin plays defense, doesn’t turnover the ball, and is efficient both on offense and defense. Also, he hustles. In the Ivy League, he led across a large number of categories, including points, steals, rebounds, assists, assist to turnover ration, etc. and established benchmarks for a guard across many such categories–in fact, all time records for a guard to have such all-around abilities.
What we saw, watching him two years ago, was a guy who refused to lose. He could penetrate and score; penetrate and dish out to the three line; penetrate and dish to the man beside him after drawing the double-team; penetrate and dish to the open man; had amazing peripheral vision; could drop the three or the jumper if left unattended; always could run the ball and locate the open man on the run; could play defense; could steal the ball; could rebound and start the break the other way; in short, he was a complete player.
And Lin never stopped to breath. He was always in continuous motion. Harvard had a lot of talented players, but they looked kind of confused unless Lin got them the ball and he was coordinating the offense. He was, in short, a terrific and talented point guard who had game.
A lot of Penn players have played in the NBA, but not so much Harvard. Hockey has always been the winter sport at Harvard, along with playing the stock market and inventing new financial instruments the SEC can’t regulate.
Three players including Lin played in the NBA:
http://www.basketball-reference.com/friv/colleges.cgi?college=harvard#stats::none
first was
Saul Mariaschin
http://www.basketball-reference.com/players/m/mariasa01.html
who was a 5 foot 11 inch player on the 1947-48 Boston Celtics. The Celtics were in a predecessor league to the NBA, but who cares?
Here were Saul Mariaschin’s teammates on the Boston Celtics of 1947-48:
http://www.basketball-reference.com/teams/BOS/1948.html
Here’s another of his teammates from that legendary Celts team:
CHUCK CONNORS. Yes, the guy who later played the RIFLEMAN on TV. Lucas McCain himself. And a 6’5″ grad of Seton Hall, which in 1947-48 would have made him a giant player. And he was a CELTIC. You can look it up.
http://www.basketball-reference.com/players/c/connoch01.html
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chuck_Connors
Chuck Connors also played baseball for the Brooklyn Dodgers!
And he was a TV Star!
The second player that went to Harvard and played in the NBA was
Ed Smith
Edward Bernard Smith (Ed)
Ed Smith was a New York Knick in 1953-54. On that Knicks team, Ed played with Vince “Moose” Boryla, Nate “Sweetwater” Clifton, Al McGuire and Dick McGuire, and the famous Ernie Vandeweghe, and others well-noted.
That 1953-54 Knicks team finished 1st in the Eastern Division, going 44-28 under the helm of the legendary Joe Lapchick. And they played in the old Madison Square Garden, which many hold in as high esteem as the old Boston Garden.
and here’s ernie vandewege v bob cousy:
Of course, Ernie has some bloodlines. Kiki Vanderweghe was a great NBA player, and now his granddaughter is a professional tennis player:
Stephen Toulmin, a Philosopher and Educator, Dies at 87
December 22, 2009
STEPHEN EDELSTEIN TOULMIN 1922-1909 a philosophical giant
obit from stephen grimes of the ny times
From http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/11/education/11toulmin.html?_r=1&pagewanted=print
reprinted in global debate blog at
http://globaldebateblog.blogspot.com/2009/12/stephen-toulmin-pases-away.html
Toulmin was a great yet unknown and unheralded philosopher and writer of great academic and widespread influence in many circles.
He was an epistemologist and also influenced the modern revival of practical argumentation theory, also known as the new rhetoric, with a small book he published in 1958 known as “the uses of argument”, which is still a classic today.
Toulmin’s argumentation theories, which were refined over the course of many more articles and books, resulted in what was known as a Toulmin argument, to quot from the wikipedia article on Toulmin;
Toulmin believed that a good argument can succeed in providing good justification for a claim that will stand up to criticism and earn a favourable verdict. In The Uses of Argument (1958), Toulmin proposed a layout containing six interrelated components for analyzing arguments:
- Claim
- A conclusion whose merit must be established. For example, if a person tries to convince a listener that he is a British citizen, the claim would be “I am a British citizen.” (1)
- Evidence (Data)
- A fact one appeals to as a foundation for the claim. For example, the person introduced in 1 can support his claim with the supporting data “I was born in Bermuda.” (2)
- Warrant
- A statement authorizing movement from the data to the claim. In order to move from the data established in 2, “I was born in Bermuda,” to the claim in 1, “I am a British citizen,” the person must supply a warrant to bridge the gap between 1 and 2 with the statement “A man born in Bermuda will legally be a British citizen.” (3)
- Backing
- Credentials designed to certify the statement expressed in the warrant; backing must be introduced when the warrant itself is not convincing enough to the readers or the listeners. For example, if the listener does not deem the warrant in 3 as credible, the speaker will supply the legal provisions as backing statement to show that it is true that “A man born in Bermuda will legally be a British citizen.”
- Rebuttal
- Statements recognizing the restrictions which may legitimately be applied to the claim. The rebuttal is exemplified as follows: “A man born in Bermuda will legally be a British citizen, unless he has betrayed Britain and has become a spy of another country.”
- Qualifier
- Words or phrases expressing the speaker’s degree of force or certainty concerning the claim. Such words or phrases include “probably,” “possible,” “impossible,” “certainly,” “presumably,” “as far as the evidence goes,” and “necessarily.” The claim “I am definitely a British citizen” has a greater degree of force than the claim “I am a British citizen, presumably.”
The first three elements, “claim,” “data,” and “warrant,” are considered as the essential components of practical arguments, while the second triad, “qualifier,” “backing,” and “rebuttal,” may not be needed in some arguments.
When Toulmin first proposed it, this layout of argumentation was based on legal arguments and intended to be used to analyze the rationality of arguments typically found in the courtroom. Toulmin did not realize that this layout could be applicable to the field of rhetoric and communication until his works were introduced to rhetoricians by Wayne Brockriede and Douglas Ehninger. Only after Toulmin published Introduction to Reasoning (1979) were the rhetorical applications of this layout mentioned in his works.
Toulmin’s argument model has inspired research on, for example, argument maps and associated software.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stephen_Toulmin
Toulmin arguments are therefore routinely used in modern legal argumentation, in law schools, in oratory and rhetoric, and have formed the foundation of modern college and high school debating, especially lincoln-douglas debating which has become the preferred form of debate in recent years.
Toulmin arguments are used in many other ways and in many other contexts. His work will be studied and debated for many years to come. His work is illuminating and inspires one to further considerations of the subject matter. Finally, Toulmin had a fond regard for the ancient greeks and their original traditions of epistemology, rhetoric and oratory, and their practical uses of same vs. their scientific uses of same. He was always careful to draw the distinction between empirical use of language and persuasive use of language, and in this, he succeeded admirably. By doing so, he revived the modern notion of argument and managed to win a small victory over the british analytic school which denied even the possibility of metaphysics in a modern world.
–art kyriazis, december 22, 2009
THE 2009 YANKEES ARE THE 2003 TEXAS RANGERS AGAIN – A TEAM THAT WON 71 GAMES WITH TEIXEIRA AND A-ROD BUT WITH AROD UP THEIR NOSE?
October 30, 2009
the 2003 texas rangers, with mark teixeira and alex rodriquez, won 71 and lost 91, and finished last in the al west.
the rangers then got a salary demand from AROD and decided to unload him on the yanks for alfonso soriano and build around Teixeira.
the next year, the rangers went up 20 games and were in first place most of the year. you have to remember Buck Showalter was manager, a hardass, and he thought arod was lazy.
of course, since arod went to ny, they blew the 3-0 lead to boston in 2004 (arod batted .258), have lost all those series since, he’s been photographed with strippers and ladies of the night in toronto and elsewhere, he’s been CAROUSING with madonna, born in 1958 (older than me), CAVORTING with kate hudson, who was married to a wild rock star (cooties galore in her privies) and of course, he was taking steroids.
plus, he’s now 35 and on the downside of an illustrious career. 7 years ago he was hiting 57 homers a year. now it’s down to 30 or so. He’s still good, but he’s declined with age. It’s obvious he can’t hit the high fastball or the low one the way Teixeira or Matsui can. AROD collects all his hits off bad pitchers. plus he’s ugly.
why did the yanks get good this year? one word: Teixeira. He’s the man. the phils almost drafted him in 1999, but they had scott rolen at 3b, so Texas drafted him instead. T-man was a 3d baseman in college.
can you imagine if the phils had Teixeira now at 3b with Rollins, Utley and Howard?????
the “mighty” yanks have feet of clay. they have three starters and a lousy bullpen.
derek jeter is 40. but has heart and will to win.
jorge posada is 40. but has heart and will to win.
mariano rivera is 40. but has heart and will to win.
andy petitte is 39. but has heart and will to win.
alex rodriguez is 35. no heart, clubhouse cancer. losing mentality. net minus on any ballclub.
melky cabrera is all field no hit.
hideki matsui is 35 but he can still play.
nick swisher is a legit young player.
mark teixeira is a great player with heart.
cc sabathia is great, but he has a psych prob with phils dating back to last year with milwaukee. he’s 0-2 with 3 homers in 11 innings in 2 playoff games. he averages .7 hrs given up a game. but in playoff games v. phils, that number is 4 homers per 9 innings. methinks he chokes in phils games. phils are 2-0 v sabathia in post season play. sabathia has never beaten the phils in a post season game.
aj burnett is great. he was great with the marlins. always had filthy nasty stuff.
johnny damon is nearly 40. he’s done. nothing left. he looks lost as a lamb out there. can’t even field. the guy’s whole game was built on speed. it’s all gone now. bat speed and foot speed.
meanwhile, all of the phillies are around 30 and at their peak, end of discussion. Pedro is the oldest guy, and he’s only 38 and still has a live arm, as you can plainly see.
cole hamels is 25. cliff lee is 31. ryan howard is 29. chase utley is 30. rollins is 31. only ibanez is old at 37, but he was the starting lf for the all start team.
phils lineup:
rollins – nl mvp 2008, gold glove 32
victorino – nl allstar 2009, gold glove 25
utley – nl allstar multiple years, silver slugger multiple years, gold glove 30
howard – nl mvp 2007, nl all star multiple years, silver slugger, home run derby champion 29
werth – nl all star 2009 30
ibanez – starting lf nl all star 2009 37
feliz – gold glove quality defense 34
ruiz – gold glove quality defense, can hit some 30
our lineup is younger and more powerful than the yanks.
and our pitchers are younger and better than the yanks.
also they have arod. no team with arod has ever won anything.
i’ve looked at the yanks pitching stats, and i’m mystified at who their #4 starter will be, because they don’t have one. joba chamberlain’s numbers are horrible and so are everyone else’s, but cc sabathia can’t work on 3 days, plus the phils have a hoodoo on him of some kind dating back to the milwaukee series last year.
the phils by contrast are throwing cole hamels, last years 1 starter, as their 3 starter this year, and joe blanton, who used to be the a’s 1 starter, as their 4 starter, and they still have ja happ, the nl rookie of the year, their 5 starter, available to come in and bail anyone out who can’t get out of the 3d inning.
the phils look a lot deeper in the bullpen and starting rotation to me. plus pedro looked pretty good to me last night. burnett was filthy and nasty but pedro only made two mistakes.
at this point i will note that it’s Teixeira, not ARod, that’s the money player. last year Teixeira was with the Sox, and the Sox went to seven games with the Rays. the yanks were eviscerated.
this year, teixeiras with the yanks, and the yanks get to the series. coincidence, I think not. let’s examine history.
in 2003, the Texas Rangers had ARod and Teixeira. they won 71 and lost 91. they finished last, dead last, in the al west.
and that team had rafael palmeiro and some other big boppers on it too.
in feb 2004 they traded arod to ny for soriano to build around Teixeira.
the next year, 2004, texas rangers, the awful texas rangers, who everyone thought stunk, well, they improved by 20 games. remember, buck showalter was a hard ass who thought arod was a playboy who was ruining the clubhouse.
guess what, he was right.
the rangers almost won the al west without arod and led by teixeira, who had a monster year. because texeira is about baseball, not partying or steroids.
arod meanwhile reversed the curse for the sox, blowing the 3-0 lead (and batting only .258 in the alcs in 2004) (see fever pitch) and led the yankees to five years of division and alcs losses. you might as well tatoo “loser” on arod’s arm or something.
also a divorce, pictures with strippers and hookers, an affair with madonna, born in 1958, an affair with kate hudson, who was married to a filthy drug addicted rock star from the black crowes (so shes a skank too) and he’s outed as a steroids user.
plus he’s 35 and on the downside of his career. he’s hitting 30 homers, but remember, this is a guy who used to hit 47, 57, 59 a year in texas when he was younger. he’s in age-related decline, and he can’t hit the fastball anymore like he used to. he hits bad pitchers only now. he looked awful against lee and worse against pedro martinez the last two night, legit aces both.
plus he’s ugly.
it’s teixeira who’s the ballplayer–and when the yanks needed someone to step up–he did. that was as clutch a homer as you’ll ever see a guy hit. and matsui’s was even better, on an unhittable pitch.
but i like the phils to sweep at home and close these yanks out.
by the way the phils almost drafted teixeira in 1999–he was a college 3d basemen–but they had scott rolen at the time and took a pass so texas had him.
can you imagine if we had an infield with teixeira at 3b, with rollins utley and howard?
the yanks won one legit last night. matsui hit an unhittable pitch, so did texeira, plus burnett was filthy and nasty. the yanks still pedro’s daddy. but the phils were playing with house money since they won game one. they have cole hamels, last year’s #1, pitching third in the rotation, and the yanks have 39 year old andy pettitte, which is not great for them. and they have no #4 starter. we have joe blanton and rookie of the year ja happ.
the phils will sweep at home.
bank it. jro had it right.
also the birds beat the giants sunday to make it a clean sweep of new yawk.
art kyriazis philly home of the world champion phillies
nl pennant winners 2008
nl pennant winners 2009
2-0 vs cc sabathia in post season play
world series champions 2008
3-0 at citizens bank park in world series play
A recent article in the Wall Street Journal is gaining some currency. It’s cited at http://blogs.wsj.com/health/2009/09/30/report-paints-dark-picture-of-health-care-costs-in-2019/
and paints a dark picture of american health care costs by 2019 if we do nothing about the current health care economiy.
However, the authors of the study are the URBAN INSTITUTE, which it turns out is a think tank which is biased strongly to producing reports and conclusions strongly tilted in favor of the Democratic Party and Obama.
Here’s what Dorn & Zuckerman of the same Urban Institute said about the President’s Health Care Plan just ten days earlier in another study:
Debunking the Government Takeover Myth
By Stan Dorn and Stephen Zuckerman
Of the many unfounded claims now coloring the health care debate, at least one can be taken off the table. As President Obama told the nation September 9, it’s time to stop making “wild claims about a government takeover of health care.” He’s right and here’s why.
For starters, pending legislation would leave our largely private medical care system intact. Right now, more than 90 percent of doctors are in private practice and 84 percent of all hospital admissions are to private facilities. That wouldn’t change as a result of any reform proposals.
If it’s Big Brother in the examination room that seems chilling, that’s not at issue either. Nothing in the thousand pages of reform proposals would give the federal government any new authority to intervene in private health care decisions. “Death panels” are as imaginary as Lord Voldemort, and government’s role would be largely what it is now: helping low-income Americans pay for health coverage and regulating insurance companies so they better serve consumers.
Under the new proposals millions of Americans would see their health care options increase. Workers covered through small firms, for instance, could choose from a range of health plans available in a new health insurance “exchange,” a convenient new marketplace that could make both private and public options available. Today, three fourths of these workers are offered only one health plan by their employer.
And when people work for themselves or a company that doesn’t provide any insurance at all, they are on their own today. After reform, these people can choose one of the plans offered through the exchange. They will get financial help if they need it and won’t have to worry, as many do today, that insurers will deny coverage if they or family members have pre-existing health problems.
Health care markets aren’t headed for socialism under the new plans either. Assessing the original House of Representatives proposal in July, the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office estimated that by 2019, about 12 million people (or 4 percent of Americans under age 65) would enroll in the public option. That means that about 191 million would still be covered by private insurance. And, importantly, it’s the consumer who chooses between public and private.
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/901286_govt_takeover_myth.pdf
Note that the title of the study is “DEBUNKING THE GOVERMENT TAKEOVER MYTH”.
It’s pretty elemental that in addition to bias, one of the key fallacies in evidentiary and logical argumentation is the fallacy of deductively reasoning back from the conclusion to the facts, which is what people of faith do, rather than doing what scientists properly do, which is studying the facts impartially and inferring the proper theories from the facts, a process referred to as inductive generalization.
Here, the authors Dorn & Zuckerman commit the fallacy of improper generalization or hasty generalization, in that they rush to the conclusion before they’ve had a full chance to study the facts.
In another study by the same groups, they forced a conclusion as well;
Summary
Current national health reform proposals would not cause “a government takeover of health care.” Pending legislation
would leave in place the country’s largely private medical care system, in which more than 90 percent of doctors are in
private practice and 84 percent of all hospital admissions are to private facilities.
Reform proposals would not give the federal government new authority to intervene in private health care decisions.
Rather, legislation would mainly extend two current responsibilities of the public sector: to fund health coverage for lowincome,
uninsured Americans and to regulate health insurance so that it meets consumers’ needs. In fact, reform
proposals would substantially increase health plan choices for many people, including workers covered by small firms.
While 73.2 percent of these employees are offered just one plan today, pending legislation would let them choose from
among multiple, diverse health plans available in a new health insurance exchange.
http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/411952_current_health_reform.pdf
same fallacies as other study, this one called Current Health Reform Proposals: No Government Takeover of American Health Care. Again, see how they jump to the conclusion instead of proceeding carefully through the process of inductive generalization, as a scientist should?
The papers are flawed because they are biased, fail to proceed through proper inductive processes, and proceed to conclusions based on logical flaws of analogical reasoning, including hasty and improper generalization.
Consequently, we cannot accept their claims that the status quo is so horribly flawed that it will run up costs amuk by 2019, can we?
Basically, the Urban Institute takes a one-sided view; they think the private sector is poison, and big government is the cure.
On a personal note, I sincerely hope this is not the same Stan Dorn I used to know from Harvard Debate. He really should know better. He was one of the smartest, hardest working guys I ever knew.
–art kyriazis
home of the world champion phillies
NL East champs 2007-2009
copyright arthur j kyriazis 2009 no use or other reprint without the express written permission of arthur j kyriazis.
If there’s one thing we’ve learned from watching Movies like Ocean’s Eleven or TV shows like Leverage, if you want to pull the long con, you have to make sure that nothing is what it seems, or else you can’t pull off a long con when everyone in the world is watching and the cameras are running. But that is just what Iran, Ahmadinajed and the Ayatollahs of Iran have been doing for the last six and half years—in plain view of everyone—pulling the longest con in the history of international politics. And when they get nukes sometime next year, they’re going to make Danny Ocean and his ten buddies seem like a small-timers and small potatoes.
Right now, the ayatollahs of Iran are in the midst of one of the longest long cons in the history of international politics. Their short marks are the Iranian people, the middle-term marks the people of Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan, and their long-term marks are Israel and the United States and the rest of the world.
Throwing missiles around and setting up secret nuclear enrichment plants has been one element of Iran’s long con. The fact is that they’ve been working on getting nuclear weapons, on and off, since 1979, and working on it in earnest since 2001, and in particular since 2003. Anything they’ve said and done to the contrary has all been part of the long con on the international community. Like the proverbial Cretan liar, everything they say and do is a lie. They are incapable of telling a truth.
Everyone is so focused on the fact that the 2009 election is crooked, that they’ve overlooked the fact that the 2005 election in which Ahmadinajed came to power originally, was completely and totally crooked, and was hijacked in a much worse fashion, than the 2009 election. And further overlooked the fact that Ahmadinajed was hand-picked in 2003 by the Ayatollah Khameini to be the radical right wing candidate of change in the 2005 elections, for the specific and long-term goals of Iranian intervention in Iraq, the building up of Iranian nuclear armaments, and the destabilization of U.S. efforts at building up middle eastern democracy in Iraq, in Afghanistan, in Pakistan, in Palestine and in the Middle East region.
Ahmadinajed’s history is that of working actively to secure the 52 U.S. hostages in 1979-81; interrogate them; working in Iranian covert intelligence, interrogation and torture from 1979-2003, and being a fanatical devotee of both the Ayatollah Khomeini and the Ayatollah Khameini.
Ahmadinajed is a vicious anti-Semite who denies the existence of the Holocaust and preaches the destruction of Israel by any means necessary, including the use of nuclear weapons and missiles. He co-mingles this message with one of the return of the 13th imam or Mahdi, a key element of millenarian shi’ite prophecy which predicts the return of the true caliph in occultation who is the rightful descendant of Ali, the rightful caliph and rightful heir to the prophet Muhammed. Upon the destruction of Israel, this event will occur, according to Ahmadinajed.
The Iranian leadership, and Ahmadinajed in particular, believe strongly that bombing Israel and other targets with nuclear weapons will hasten the arrival of the 13th imam or Mahdi, and bring about the arrival of the “millennium” and the fulfillment of shi’ite holy prophecies. Upon the destruction of Israel, this event will occur, according to Ahmadinajed
This is not a generally accepted view in twelver-shi’ism, but nonetheless, it is the view he takes.
Getting back to the long con, here’s how the long con is going down, according to multiple primary and secondary sources;
The Iranians regime in the 1990s was drifting towards a bit of moderation. Towards the end of the 1990s, there was a bit of a diplomatic opening under Secretary of State Albright and the Clinton Administration; the Iranians hosted the United States International Wrestling Team (including some professional acquaintances of mine, the Olympic Gold Medalist Kevin Jackson & Olympic Wrestler John Giura, who went on that trip), and there was a substantial thawing of relations between the two countries.
Had Al Gore been seated as U.S. President, and the Albright State Department continued in office, eventually relations between the two countries might have been normalized, and the radical elements in Iran may or may not have emerged as they did in 2003.
Instead, we all know what happened. Gore won the popular vote in the 2000 election, but the U.S. supreme court intervened to give George W. Bush, the victory in the U.S. Presidential election, on a 5-4 decision in the case of Bush v. Gore. They did so by suspending the recount in the Florida popular vote count and declaring the Florida electoral vote tally turned in by Gov. Jeb Bush’s alleged mistress, who was running the electoral board, final. George W. Bush appeared to be a fraudulent winner, since he probably didn’t win Florida’ popular vote, probably didn’t win Florida’s electoral vote, probably didn’t win the electoral college, and definitely didn’t win the popular vote.
The ayatollahs in Iran sat up and took notice of this. They realized after watching President Bush take office in this officious way, that they, too, could steal elections in their country, and that the United States would say nothing about it, because, after all, President Bush had stolen the election as well. What could he say about stealing an election, after all?
So the hardliners in Iran, who have wanted control of Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, the destruction of Israel (where they have been funding Hamas and Hezbollah since the late 1970s, and helped destroy Lebanon as well as destabilize Palestine) decided on a plan to abandon their moderation and take a hardline approach with the usurper of the American Presidency and test him as no one had been tested before in American history.
So first of all, Iran along with bin Laden, hit hard at the U.S. on 9/11/2001. We all remember that. They decided to test the usurper, Bush II.
The response by the Bush II Administration was decidedly peculiar. Instead of seeking multilateral assistance, the Bush II Administration ventured forth into Afghanistan and then Iraq more or less singlehandedly with some allies, instead of as part of a generalized U.N. police force action as his father had done with the Kuwaiti liberation action.
To his credit, Bush II at least stood up to this infamy and hit back hard, and with everything the U.S. had. He certainly didn’t knuckle under. And he crafted a careful and thorough anti-terrorist policy almost immediately. But as Richard Clarke and others on the 9/11 Commission have documented, the Bush II Administration came to these positions only after 9/11 occurred.
Without determining the merits or demerits of the Bush II war interventions, suffice it to say that the Iranian leadership saw the American war intervention in Iraq as an opportunity.
First, in 2003, the Americans came to Iran and negotiated with them a stand still agreement for Iran to stay out of Iraq. But in exchange for this, Iran asked for, and obtained, the United States’ agreement for the US to bomb, and eradicate, all of the based of the MEK, stationed outside the border of Iran, in Iraq.
The MEK, up until 2003, was the primary opposition group in exile fighting the Iranian Revolution. In the event of a popular uprising, they would be able to come to Iran and assume power. They had bases just outside of Iran in order to invade the country and help a popular revolution if one occurred. Until 2003, the MEK were supported by Saddam Hussein and by the United States.
In 2003, the US betrayed the MEK and sold them down the river along with betraying Saddam Hussein, in exchange for a nonsensical deal with the Iranian Ayatollahs to stay out of Iraq, which the Ayatollahs have never honored. The MEK was bombed, all their camps bombed and eradicated by the United States, and the Iranian Ayatollahs had a major thorn in their sides removed by the United States.
The biggest fear of the Iranian Ayatollahs is a popular uprising followed by an armed intervention. With the MEK gone, there is no danger of an armed intervention. Moreover, what no one realizes is that the United States has AGREED that there will be no armed interventions in Iran as a quid pro quo to its occupation of Iraq as part of the 2003 agreement. In essence, the United States has abrograted its protection of the rights of 80 million Iranian citizens for very little in return.
And yet the Iranian Ayatollahs did not deliver on their promises. They did stay out of Iraq in the sense of not formally invading, but they stepped up their campaign of terrorist bombing, of terrorist infiltration, and of terrorist everything. Since 2003, the number of US soldiers and Iraqi citizens killed by terrorists and other organized NGOs sponsored by Iran has skyrocketed, and there is no peace in the land of Iraq.
It was then, in 2003, that Iran and its Ayatollahs foresaw their opportunity for the longest con of all—installing a President with a worldview like their own at the head of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The man they groomed for the job was none other than Mahmoud Ahmadinajed.
Starting in 2003, they laid the groundwork for stealing the 2005 elections from the people of Iran. Plans were made for stuffing ballots, for miscounting election results, and in general, for defrauding the people of Iran of their right to vote for President.
The inspiration for the Ayatollahs was all too clear. They all had watched CNN for two months in the fall and winter of 2000. They saw George W. Bush steal the American election. They properly reasoned that if he could it, so could they.
Moreover, they further reasoned, if Bush was in power, he had no legitimacy to complain if they, Iran, stole an election, since he, Bush, was in power due to a stolen election. It would be a joke if he complained.
And in this, they would be proven completely correct. The groundwork for their long con was laid down.
So what happened in the 2005 elections? A gigantic fraud was perpetrated on the Iranian electorate. The favored two candidates won with 21% and 19% of the vote, and Ahmadinajed was third. Only the first two were supposed to get into the runoff.
But a week later, the Ayatollahs declared that Ahmadinajed was actually second, and knocked the second place guy off the run-off ballot their boy Ahmadinajed on.
Then, in the run-off, in 2005, the Ayatollahs came up with a vote count of Ahmadinajed 66%, and the other guy 33%, even though all polls showed Ahmadinajed couldn’t possible be getting more than 33% of the vote. It was exactly the same garbage that the Ayatollahs pulled this past year, in 2009.
But what could the Bush II Administration do? They couldn’t protest. After all, they themselves had been elected under a cloud and under fraudulent pretenses, the most fraudulent, contested and controversial United States election in American History since the Samuel Tilden-Rutherford B. Hayes election of 1876 (which resulted in the end of Reconstruction, by the way, in exchange for the Presidency). Even the 2004 election had some questions. So they couldn’t very well question the Iranian election. Moreover, they had made DEALS with this Iranian Government regarding non-incursions into Iraq as of 2003 (see discussion, supra).
So they said nothing.
That brings us slowly, inexorably, to the present serious situation, which has been bubbling slowly below the surface for a long, long time.
The Iranian people who protested their government in the streets this past spring were nothing short of heroes, like the Hungarian people of 1956 and the Czech people of 1968. The United States Government should have extended a lifeline to help overthrow their government when it was weak and subject to pressure by its people, but President Obama stood still and did nothing, much as President Bush I stood still and did nothing during Tianamen Square twenty years ago.
This was reprehensible.
These people deserved freedom.
Now the show trials have begun, the repressions, the tortures, the killings, the executions and the inevitable purges. The Iranian hardliners fear only one thing—internal revolution. It happened, and the U.S. did nothing to help it along. Now the Ayatollahs know we will do nothing to help such a revolution along, they fear such an insurrection even less.
No wonder they are developing nuclear weapons. No wonder they are firing medium range intercontinental ballistic missiles. No wonder they send President Ahmadinajed to the U.N. where he denies the Holocaust, denounces Israel and makes a mockery of the very concept of the United Nations on U.S. soil. They do not fear the United States at all.
Soon the long con will come to a close and nuclear weapons will be fired from Iran and World War III will begin.
Only Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, a very modest man who grew up part of his life in suburban Philadelphia, seems ready, willing and able to take the right actions. He seems willing to take a pre-emptory military strike against Iran to take out their nuclear capacity, much as Israel did with Iraq back in 1981.
This is the proper and correct action. All this multilateralism the United States is going through is too little too late. The bottom line is the U.S. needs to take military action against Iran to take out the Weapons of Mass Destruction.
This isn’t like Iraq—we know Iran has WMDs this time. We have rights under the UN Charter, under Article 51, to take a pre-emptory military strike.
It would be defensive war and it would be justified both on international law grounds and because Iran has violated the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
The Administration’s response to this new Hitler of the sands will define it for all history.
–art kyriazis, philly
copyright arthur j kyriazis 2009 no use or other reprint without the express written permission of arthur j kyriazis.
home of the World Champion Phillies
NL East Division Champions 2007-2009
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4) Scholarly Articles in Academic Journals
A.H.H. Abidi. “The Iranian Revolution: Its Origins and Dimensions.” (April-June 1979) International Studies. (Volume 18, Number. 2). 18:129 161.
Ismail Ajami. “Differential Fertility in Peasant Communities: A Study of Six Iranian Villages.” (November 1976). Population Studies. (Volume 30, Number 3). 30:453-463.
Elizabeth Bacon. 1947. “Soviet Policy in Turkestan.” Middle East Journal. (Volume One, Number Four). (October 1947). 1:386-400.
Cheryl Benard & Zalmay Khalilzad. 1979. “Secularization, Industrialization, and Khomeini’s Islamic Republic.” Political Science Quarterly. (Volume 94, Number 2). (Summer, 1979). 94:229 41.
Peter Bender. 1987. “The Superpower Squeeze.” Foreign Policy. (Winter 1987). 65: 98 113.
James A. Bill. 1973. “The Plasticity of Informal Politics: The Case of Iran.” Middle East Journal. (Spring 1973). (Volume 27, No.2). 27:131-151.
James A. Bill. 1969. “The Politics of Student Alienation: The Case of Iran.” Iranian Studies. (Winter 1969) (Volume II, no. 1). 2:8-26.
James H. Billington. 1987. “Realism and Vision in American Foreign Policy.” Foreign Affairs. (Volume 65, Number. 3). 65:630 52.
Leonard Binder. 1957. “Pakistan and Modern Islamic-Nationalist Theory.” Middle East Journal. (Volume 11, Number 4, Autumn 1957). 11:382-396. (Part I of II).
William C. Bodie. 1988. “The American Strategy Schism.” Strategic Review. (Volume xvi, number. 2). (Spring 1988). 16:9 15.
Thompson Buchanan. 1982. “The Real Russia.” Foreign Policy. (Summer 1982). 47:26 45.
Hedley Bull. 1979. “A View From Abroad: Consistency Under Pressure.” Foreign Affairs. (Volume 57, No. 3, Special Issue on “America and the World”). 57: at pp. 451-455.
Richard Cottam. 1991. “Charting Iran’s New Course.” Current History. (January, 1991).
90:21-24.
Edward Mead Earle. 1929. “American Missions in the Near East.” Foreign Affairs. (Volume 7, No. 2). (January 1929). 7:398 417.
C.J. Edmonds. 1957. “The Kurds of Iraq.” Middle East Journal. (Volume 11, Number 1, Winter 1957). 11:52-62.
Hamid Enayat 1973. “The Politics of Iranology.” Iranian Studies. (Volume vi, No. 1). (Winter, 1973). 6:2 20.
Asghar Fathi. 1980. “Role of the Traditional Leader in Modernization of Iran, 1890 1910.” International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies. (February 1980). 11:87 98.
Richard W. Gable. 1959. “Culture and Administration in Iran. Middle East Journal. (Volume. 13, no. 4). (Autumn, 1959). 13:407-__________.
Charles F. Gallagher. 1966. “Contemporary Islam: The Plateau of Particularism—Problems of Religion and Nationalism in Iran.” (July 1966). American Universities Field Staff. Southwest Asia Series Vol XV, No. 2 (Iran) (CFG-2-1966). 15:1-24.
Deniz Gökalp & Seda Ünsar. 2008. “From the Myth of European Accession to Disillusion: Implications for Religious and Ethnic Polarization in Turkey.” Middle East Journal. 62:93-118.
Yair P. Hirschfield. 1980. “Moscow And Khomeini: Soviet Iranian Relations in Historical Perspective.” Orbis. (Summer, 1980). _____:219 40.
Samuel P. Huntington. “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs. (1993). [additional citation needed].
Nikki R. Keddie. 1968. “The Iranian Village Before and After Land Reform.” Journal of Contemporary History. (Volume 3, Number 3). (July, 1968). 3:69 92.
Nikki R. Keddie. 1962. “Religion and Irreligion in Early Iranian Nationalism.” Comparative Studies in Society and History. (Volume IV, Number 3). (April, 1962). 4:265 95.
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Walter J. Levy. 1981. “Oil: An Agenda for the 1980s.” Foreign Affairs. (Volume 59, Number 5). (Summer 1981). 59:1079 1101.
Samuel S. Lieberman. 1979. “Notes and Commentary: Prospects for Development and Population Growth in Iran.” Population and Development Review. (Volume Five, Number 2). (June 1979). 5:293-317.
Herbert J. Liebesny. 1967. “Stability and Change in Islamic Law. Middle East Journal. (Volume 21, Number 1). (Winter, 1967). 21:16 34.
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Hossein Mahdavy. 1965. “The Coming Crisis in Iran.” Foreign Affairs. (Volume 44, Number 1). (October 1965). 44:134 46.
Phebe Marr. 1991. “Iraq’s Uncertain Future.” Current History. (January, 1991). 90:1-4 & pp. 39-42.
George Michael. 2007. “Deciphering Ahmadinejad’s Holocaust Revisionism.” Middle East Quarterly.” (Volume 14, Number 3) (Summer 2007). 14:11-18
David D. Newsom. 1981. “America EnGulfed.” Foreign Policy. (Volume __________, Number. 43). (Summer 1981). __________:17 32.
Richard Pipes. 1955. “Muslims of Soviet Central Asia: Trends and Prospects. Part II [of II].” Middle East Journal. (Volume Nine, No. Three). (Summer 1955). 9:295-308.
Richard Pipes. 1955. “Muslims of Soviet Central Asia: Trends and Prospects. Part I [of II].” Middle East Journal. (Volume Nine, Number Two). (Spring 1955). 9:147-162.
Rouhollah K. Ramazani. 1974. “Iran’s ‘White Revolution: A Study in Political Development.” International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies. (Volume __________, (Number 5). __________:124 39.
Bernard Reich. 1991. “The United States in the Middle East. Current History. (January, 1991). 90:5-8 & p.42.
Abbas William Sammii. 2008. “A Stable Structure on Shifting Sands: Assessing the Hizbullah-Iran-Syria Relationship.” Middle East Journal. 62:32-53.
Philip C. Salzman. 1972. “Persian Land Reform and the Shah.” The Muslim World. (Volume LXII, Number 3). (July 1972). 62:241 46.
Abraham D. Sofaer. 1986. “Terrorism and the Law. Foreign Affairs. (Volume 64, Number 5). (Summer, 1986). 64:901 22.
Ray Tayekh. “Iran’s New Iraq.” Middle East Journal. (2008). 62:13-31.
Van Hollen, Christopher, “Don’t Engulf the Gulf,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 59, no. 5 (Summer 1981): 1064 78.
William Linn Westermann. “Kurdish Independence and Russian Expansion.” Foreign Affairs. (Volume 24, Number 4, July 1946). 24:675:686.
Robin Wright. “Islam’s New Political Face.” Current History. (January, 1991). 90:25-28 & pp. 35-36.
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5) Book Reviews
Edward Allworth. 1960. Book Review. Russian Central Asia 1867: A Study in Colonial Rule. By Richard A. Pierce. (University of CA Press, Berkeley & Los Angeles, CA). (viii + 359 pp. $7.00). Reviewed in Middle East Journal. (Volume 14, No. 4). (Autumn 1960). 14:483-484.
Peter Avery. 1975. Book Review. The Golden Age of Persia: The Arabs in the East. By Richard N. Frye (Barnes and Nobles and Harper and Row, New York, NY, 1975), 290 pages. Illus. Maps. $25.00. Reviewed in Middle East Journal. (Volume 29, No. 4). (August 1975). 29:470-471.
Hafez F. Farmayan. 1971. Book Review. Religion and State in Iran, 1785-1906: The Role of the Ulama in the Qajar Period.” By Hamid Algar. (University of CA Press, Berkeley, CA, 1970). (286 pp., Index, $9.50). Reviewed in Middle East Journal. (Volume 25, Number 3). (Summer 1971). 25:413-415.
Harold Glidden. 1959. Book Review. The Muqaddimah, by Ibn Khaldūn. Translated by Franz Rosenthal. (Pantheon Books, New York, NY, 1958). (Vol. I cxv + 481 pp, [five] (5) plates and [two] (2) figures); (Vol. II xiv + 463 pp, [nine] (9) plates); (Vol. III xi + 603 pp., [four] (4) plates and diagram in pocket, indexed, $18.50). Reviewed in Middle East Journal. (Volume 13, Number 3). (Summer 1959). 13:330-331.
Edward J. Jurjii. 1957. Book Review. Islam in Modern History. By Wilfred Cantwell Smith. (Princeton University Press, Princton, NJ 1957). (308 pp., index to 317 pp., $6.00). Reviewed in Middle East Journal. (Volume 11, Number 4). (Autumn 1957). 11:436-437.
Henri Laoust. 1960. Book Review. Islamic Law in the Modern World. By J.N.D. Anderson, with an Introduction by Dr. Saba Habachy. (New York University Press, New York, NY). (xx + 100 pp, bibliography to p.106, $2.75). Reviewed in Middle East Journal. (Volume 14, Number 3). (Summer 1960). 14:338.
Ernest R. McCarus. 1960. Book Review. “Kurdish Language Studies.” Reviewed in Middle East Journal. (Volume 14, Number 3). (Summer 1960). 14:325-335.
Chantal Quelquejay. 1959. Book Review. “Anti-Islamic Propaganda in Kazakhstan.” Reviewed in Middle East Journal. (Volume 13, Number 3). (Summer 1959). 13:319-327.
J. Schacht. 1967. Book Review. The Islamic Law of Nations: Shaybānī’s Siyar. Translated with an Introduction, notes and appendices by Majid Khadduri. (The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, MD 1966). (xvii + 311 pp, $8.00). Reviewed in Middle East Journal. (Volume 21, Number 2). (Spring 1967). 21:273.
Wilfred Cantwell Smith. 1957. Book Review. Islam and the West: Proceedings of the Harvard Summer School Conference on the Middle East, July 25-27, 1955. Richard N. Frye, ed. (Mouton & Co, The Hague, Netherlands, Distributed in the US by Gregory Lounz, 1956). (215 pp. $5.00). Reviewed in Middle East Journal. (Volume 11, Number 4). (Autumn 1957). 11:437-438.
Gustave Thaiss. 1976. Book Review. Shi’ite Islam. By ‘Allāmah Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Tabātabā’ī. Translated from the Persian and edited with an Introduction and Notes by Seyyed Hossein Nasr. (Albany, [NY]; State University of New York Press, 1975).” Reviewed in Middle East Journal. (Volume 30, No. 2) (Spring 1976). 30:236-237.
6) Newspapers, Periodicals, Television Shows, Websites
“Scapegoat [Hassan] Ayat.” The Economist. June 28, 1980. p. _____
“Can the ayatollah’s revolution work and last?,” The Economist, June 7, 1980.
“Crusaders Win” The Economist. June 21, 1980. p. _____
Steven Emerson. “What Walsh Didn’t Know About Ollie’s Notebooks.” The Washington Post. March 20, 1988. p._____
Steven Holmes. “Giving In to ‘Graymail’: North’s Legal Strategy Decreases the Hope for a Full Airing of the Iran-Contra Scandal.” Time. January 16, 1989. pp. 24-25.
Youseef M. Ibrahim. “The Marketplace Remains, Despite the Conflicts.” & Paul Lewis. “The O.E.C.D. is a “Reactor” Not an “Initiator””. both in “Old Rich, Oil Rich: The West v. OPEC: The Oil Cartel and the West’s Economic Club Have Turned [Twenty] 20. War or No War, Oil Prices Should Keep Stunting the Industrial Nation’s Growth.” New York Times. (Sunday) (Business Section). November 30, 1980. Section Three (3). pp. 1 & __________.
“Israel Asked U.S. for Greek Light to Bomb Nuclear Sites in Iran; U.S. President told Israeli Prime Minister he Would not back Attack on Iran, Senior European Diplomatic Sources Tell Guardian.” Thursday September 25, 2008. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/sept/25/iran.israelandthepalestinians1
(four pages). (web only).
Joseph Kraft. “Letter from Riyadh.” New Yorker. June 26, 1978. pp. 62-77.
Thomas A. Sancton. “Quarreling Over Ghosts: The Hostage Release Grows Into a Burning Internal Issue [for Iran].” Time. February 9, 1981. p. 35. Reported by Roberto Suro, Washington, DC Desk.
Jack Thomas. “New Tack in TV News: TV News Scoop on Iran Deals.” Boston Globe. February 1, 1981. pp. 1 & 13.
“Portrait of an Ascetic Despot.” Time. January 7, 1980. p._____
“An Interview with Khomeini.” Time. January 7, 1980. p._____
“The Mystic Who Lit The Fires of Hatred.” Time. January 7, 1980. p._____
Mike Wallace. “Interview of former First Lady Nancy Reagan.” CBS Sixty Minutes. First televised Sunday, January 15, 1989.
Curtis Wilkie. “Was Carter Misled on Shah Visit: False Proviso on Shah Visit?” Boston Globe. February 1, 1981. pp. 1 & 12.
7) Legal Documents, Treaties, International Agreements, International Conventions, etc.
Bilateral Agreement Between the Republic of Aghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan on the Principles of Mutual Relations, in Particular on Non-Interference and Non-Intervention. (Article II). and U.S. Statement. 1988. cited in Rosanne Klass. 1988. “Afghanistan: The Accords.” Foreign Affairs. (Volume 66, Number 5). (Summer 1988). 66:922-945 at pp. 944-945.
The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran. 1980. The Middle East Journal. __________:181 204.
The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty,
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,
the ban on chemical and biological weapons,
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter
8) Legal Citations, Law Review Articles etc.
United States v. North, _____ F. 2d _____ (1989)
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