Stephen Toulmin, a Philosopher and Educator, Dies at 87
December 22, 2009
STEPHEN EDELSTEIN TOULMIN 1922-1909 a philosophical giant
obit from stephen grimes of the ny times
From http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/11/education/11toulmin.html?_r=1&pagewanted=print
reprinted in global debate blog at
http://globaldebateblog.blogspot.com/2009/12/stephen-toulmin-pases-away.html
Toulmin was a great yet unknown and unheralded philosopher and writer of great academic and widespread influence in many circles.
He was an epistemologist and also influenced the modern revival of practical argumentation theory, also known as the new rhetoric, with a small book he published in 1958 known as “the uses of argument”, which is still a classic today.
Toulmin’s argumentation theories, which were refined over the course of many more articles and books, resulted in what was known as a Toulmin argument, to quot from the wikipedia article on Toulmin;
Toulmin believed that a good argument can succeed in providing good justification for a claim that will stand up to criticism and earn a favourable verdict. In The Uses of Argument (1958), Toulmin proposed a layout containing six interrelated components for analyzing arguments:
- Claim
- A conclusion whose merit must be established. For example, if a person tries to convince a listener that he is a British citizen, the claim would be “I am a British citizen.” (1)
- Evidence (Data)
- A fact one appeals to as a foundation for the claim. For example, the person introduced in 1 can support his claim with the supporting data “I was born in Bermuda.” (2)
- Warrant
- A statement authorizing movement from the data to the claim. In order to move from the data established in 2, “I was born in Bermuda,” to the claim in 1, “I am a British citizen,” the person must supply a warrant to bridge the gap between 1 and 2 with the statement “A man born in Bermuda will legally be a British citizen.” (3)
- Backing
- Credentials designed to certify the statement expressed in the warrant; backing must be introduced when the warrant itself is not convincing enough to the readers or the listeners. For example, if the listener does not deem the warrant in 3 as credible, the speaker will supply the legal provisions as backing statement to show that it is true that “A man born in Bermuda will legally be a British citizen.”
- Rebuttal
- Statements recognizing the restrictions which may legitimately be applied to the claim. The rebuttal is exemplified as follows: “A man born in Bermuda will legally be a British citizen, unless he has betrayed Britain and has become a spy of another country.”
- Qualifier
- Words or phrases expressing the speaker’s degree of force or certainty concerning the claim. Such words or phrases include “probably,” “possible,” “impossible,” “certainly,” “presumably,” “as far as the evidence goes,” and “necessarily.” The claim “I am definitely a British citizen” has a greater degree of force than the claim “I am a British citizen, presumably.”
The first three elements, “claim,” “data,” and “warrant,” are considered as the essential components of practical arguments, while the second triad, “qualifier,” “backing,” and “rebuttal,” may not be needed in some arguments.
When Toulmin first proposed it, this layout of argumentation was based on legal arguments and intended to be used to analyze the rationality of arguments typically found in the courtroom. Toulmin did not realize that this layout could be applicable to the field of rhetoric and communication until his works were introduced to rhetoricians by Wayne Brockriede and Douglas Ehninger. Only after Toulmin published Introduction to Reasoning (1979) were the rhetorical applications of this layout mentioned in his works.
Toulmin’s argument model has inspired research on, for example, argument maps and associated software.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stephen_Toulmin
Toulmin arguments are therefore routinely used in modern legal argumentation, in law schools, in oratory and rhetoric, and have formed the foundation of modern college and high school debating, especially lincoln-douglas debating which has become the preferred form of debate in recent years.
Toulmin arguments are used in many other ways and in many other contexts. His work will be studied and debated for many years to come. His work is illuminating and inspires one to further considerations of the subject matter. Finally, Toulmin had a fond regard for the ancient greeks and their original traditions of epistemology, rhetoric and oratory, and their practical uses of same vs. their scientific uses of same. He was always careful to draw the distinction between empirical use of language and persuasive use of language, and in this, he succeeded admirably. By doing so, he revived the modern notion of argument and managed to win a small victory over the british analytic school which denied even the possibility of metaphysics in a modern world.
–art kyriazis, december 22, 2009
In court papers filed in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia, LD Debaters Alex McCobin of Penn and Lily Deng of Harvard have been accused of embezzling more than $37,000.00 from the Penn Parlimentary & LD debate teams, their own non-profit foundation set up to allegedly run an urban debate league in Philadelphia, and from various other organizations and persons as well, according to both the filed court papers and according to an article published in the Daily Pennsylvania on April 2, 2009. Deng was a 2005 graduate of Perkiomen Valley HS outside of Philadelphia; McCobin was originally from York, PA, and the newspaper and court papers allege that McCobin & Deng were boyfriend and girlfriend, and acted in concert at all times, in terms of a conspiracy to defraud the Penn Debate Team and to defraud their own non-profit foundation.
It was not stated whether Harvard University, the University of Pa, or any law schools or state bars, had begun investigations into McCobin’s and Deng’s possibly illegal activities.
Here’s the link to the DP article:
http://media.www.dailypennsylvanian.com/media/storage/paper882/news/2009/04/02/News/Alum-Sued.For.Embezzling.Funds.From.Debate.Organization-3693518.shtml
Here’s the link to the Philadelphia Court of Common Please docketing site:
http://courts.phila.gov/common-pleas/
Here’s the Daily Pennsylvanian Article in text form:
Issue date: 4/2/09 Section: News
Debate org. sues 2008 alum Alexander McCobin over misappropriation of funds
Perspectives founder McCobin allegedly withdraw $37,000 from group’s bank account
Naomi Jagoda
Daily Pennsylvanian
2008 College alumnus Alexander McCobin has been sued by Perspectives Debate Inc. – a nonprofit organization he founded while a student at Penn to teach high-school students debate skills – for breaching his fiduciary duty to Perspectives and misappropriating its funds, including allegedly withdrawing more than $37,000 from its bank account.
The Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas granted an injunction on March 3 preventing McCobin from entering the corporation’s place of business and from issuing any checks or receiving any salary from Perspectives without the approval of its managing director.
A complaint was filed against McCobin and his Perspectives co-founder and fiancee Lilly Deng in February. The couple both resigned from Perspectives in November 2008, yet continued to access Perspectives’ business information and accounts after their departure.
Perspectives’ lawyer, Jonathan Crisp, said he is currently waiting for McCobin’s attorney to respond to the complaint.
According to members of Penn Parliamentary Debate, this is not the first time McCobin has improperly withdrawn money from organizations in which he had a leadership role. McCobin used the club’s debit card for purposes unrelated to Parli during his senior year at Penn.
Background
According to Perspectives’ Web site, McCobin and Deng met in 2002 at a summer debate camp in Boston. Inspired by their experiences at the camp, and disturbed by the expenses and distant locations of existing summer debate programs, McCobin and Deng started the Philadelphia Debate Institute in the summer of 2005.
Perspectives Debate Inc. was formally set up as a 501(c)(3) nonprofit organization in November, 2005. In addition to running the PDI, it also offers affordable after-school Lincoln-Douglass debate programs to high-school students in the mid-Atlantic region.
In the fall of 2007, McCobin, then a Penn senior, created Penn for Youth Debate as a Penn-affiliated branch of Perspectives focusing on teaching students from the Philadelphia area. Penn students are involved in the group.
“We want to change students lives and not just go through the motions. We want more students in the program and want these students to get into college, gain scholarships and get jobs,” McCobin told The Daily Pennsylvanian about the mission of Penn for Youth Debate in November, 2007.
Penn for Youth Debate is no longer aflliated with Perspectives. The organizations formally separated about two months ago, according to a member of Parli who wished to remain anonymous for fear of repercussions.
The two organizations wstill in high praise from members of Penn’s debate community.
The Parli member who wished to remain anonymous called Penn for Youth Debate a “great organization.”
Wharton senior and former Parliamentary Debate President Daniel Rubin called Perspectives and Penn for Youth Debate “high-quality organizations that shouldn’t be run down by one person.”
In Spring 2008, McCobin graduated from Penn with bachelor’s degrees in Philosophy and Economics and a masters’ degree in Philosophy. McCobin – who was also involved in Parli, founded the Penn Libertarians and was a resident adviser – currently works at the Cato Institute, a think thank in Washington, D.C.
Penn students who knew McCobin through Parli describe him as bright and cunning.
College senior and former Parli Vice President David Marcou said that while McCobin is “very smart,” he is also “very ambitious and willing to bend the rules in his favor.”
Rubin agreed, adding that he “is very good at marketing himself.”
According to court documents, McCobin and Deng, a recent Harvard University graduate, were believed to have become engaged in October, 2008.
The anonymous Parli member described McCobin and Deng’s relationship as “weird” because they did everything together. This sentiment was echoed by the complaint filed by Perspectives against them, which stated that “it was not uncommon for Deng to speak on McCobin’s behalf, or vice versa.”
Current Legal Problems
The lawsuit filed against McCobin and Deng involves their alleged inappropriate attempts to control Perspectives’ board of directors and their alleged withdrawal of money and tampering with Perspectives’ business accounts following their resignations in November 2008.
While serving as directors for Perspectives, McCobin and Deng engaged in a number of activities that were of concern to other members of the organization, according to Perspectives’ complaint.
In 2007, they added members to the board of directors without following the organization’s bylaws, the complaint stated. The bylaws called for three directors, so they should have been amended before adding additional ones.
Deng and McCobin did not make changes to the bylaws before appointing five new directors, however, and they considered all of the directors to have been properly appointed.
Later, the complaint stated, Deng and McCobin became dissatisfied with the performances of two of the recently appointed directors, and put pressure on them to either devote more time to Perspectives or to resign. One of these directors decided to resign, while the other refused and notified the other directors of the pressure put on her by McCobin and Deng.
Prior to the contact, in September 2008, one of the directors resigned for reasons unaffiliated to pressure from McCobin and Deng.
On November 17, 2008 McCobin sent the three remaining directors an e-mail that stated they were not members of the board because they had not been elected properly according to the bylaws, according to the complaint.
The next day, one of the directors sent McCobin and Deng an e-mail disputing their claim, and they suggested the board discuss the issue at a previously scheduled meeting on Nov. 20, 2008.
Instead of meeting with the board, McCobin and Deng resigned from Perspectives on Nov. 19, 2008.
Following their resignation, the remaining Board members removed McCobin and Deng from Perspectives’ business accounts, including its bank account. The Board also directed Perspectives’ managing director and recent Columbia University graduate Matthew Scarola and Perspectives’ program director and College sophomore Allison Huberlie to change the passwords for Perspectives’ accounts.
Additionally, Huberlie requested that McCobin and Deng provide Perspectives with information regarding upcoming grants and turn in their Perspectives’ checkbooks and credit cards, which according to the court documents McCobin and Deng still have not done.
Despite the actions that Perspectives’ took to revoke McCobin’s and Deng’s power, the couple allegedly managed to access Perspectives’ e-mail addresses following their resignation and the e-mails and contacts stored in one of the addresses were deleted. Deng is believed by Perspectives to have accessed the e-mail account.
The online marketing and survey accounts of Perspectives were also accessed shortly after the resignations. The survey account was believed by Perspectives to have been accessed by Deng while she was visiting McCobin’s mother, according to the complaint.
Furthermore, Scarola and Huberlie were blocked from using Perspectives’ PayPal account in late November 2008.
After McCobin and Deng were notified of the accounts’ accesses, Deng sought a lawyer who tried to negotiate a settlement on behalf of McCobin and herself.
According to the terms of the settlement, which were sent to Perspectives on Dec. 11, 2008, Deng and McCobin would only disclose the documents they had pertaining to Perspectives if Perspectives sucummbed to a number of demands, including payment of $3,000 to McCobin and Deng each.
Perspectives had to respond to the demands reqested by Deng’s lawyer prior to Dec. 12, 2008 at 5pm. The board asked for an extension to consider the settlement on Dec. 12 at 12:21 p.m, but there was no response to this request.
At 3:28 p.m. that day, $37,000 was withdrawn from Perspectives’ bank account, nearly all of the accounts’ money. A specialist for the bank said the withdrawal ticket appeared to be signed by McCobin, and the money was withdrawn from a bank near where McCobin works. The incident was reported to the police, and the bank agreed to cease payment on the cashier’s check requested for the $37,000.
Scarola later discovered that McCobin and Deng had withdrawn more money from Perspectives’ bank account prior to the $37,000. These included checks made out to each of McCobin and Deng for $3,000, as well as checks labeled as reimbursement that the board had not been made aware of.
Because of McCobin and Deng’s actions, “the board members felt it was in the best interests of the company” to bring forth a lawsuit against them, Crisp said.
Crisp added that the injunction granted last month only applies to McCobin and not Deng, because Deng has not yet been reached, and he is waiting for McCobin’s lawyers to respond to the complaint.
McCobin wrote in an e-mail that he disputes Perspectives’ allegations and plans to “defend vigorously.”
“I feel confident that legal defense will vindicate what we have done and look forward to a successful resolution of the litigation,” McCobin wrote.
An established pattern
Not only did McCobin allegedly misappropriate Perspectives’ funds, but, according to members of Parli and Penn for Youth Debate, he also engaged in irresponsible financial behavior while holding leadership positions in Penn-affiliated debate activities.
As a member of Parli, McCobin ran the team’s tournament for high-schoolers, called the Liberty Bell Classic. According to Marcou and Rubin, the Liberty Bell Classic was supposed to be a fundraiser for Parli.
In the fall of 2007, McCobin segued the Liberty Bell Classic from being a Parli event to being a Penn for Youth Debate event, which Parli leadership allowed.
In Spring 2008, when Parli’s leadership was trying to determine why the organization had a great deal of debt, they discovered that McCobin was spending money on a Parli debit card that was unrelated to the tournament. The charges included about $1,000 for rent of rooms for Perspectives’ spring debate and $400 for a camera that was never seen by Parli or Penn for Youth Debate, according to Rubin and Marcou. The camera is believed to have been used for personal purposes, they added.
When Parli leadership tried to confront McCobin about his spending, “he was not very pleased,” Rubin said.
Eventually, issues concerning the debt brought on from the tournament were resolved with the Office of Student Life. Penn for Youth Debate assumed most of the responsibility and the debt for the tournament.
OSL associate director Rodney Robinson confirmed that he helped resolve financial issues between Parli and Penn for Youth Debate,but wrote in an email that he was unaware of any “personal purchases” by McCobin.
Now, Parli and Penn for Youth Debate are on good terms with each other, according to Rubin, Marcou and Huberlie, who is the president of Penn for Youth Debate in addition to her role at Perspectives.
Marcou and Rubin also emphasized that it was with McCobin, not with Penn for Youth Debate, that Parli experienced problems.
NOW HERE’S THE DOCKET FROM THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
Case Description
Case ID: 090201768
Case Caption: PERSPECTIVES DEBATE INCORPORATED VS MCCOBIN ETAL
Filing Date: Thursday , February 12th, 2009
Court: EXPEDITED NON-JURY
Location: City Hall
Jury: NON JURY
Case Type: EQUITY – NO REAL ESTATE (TRO)
Status: LISTED FOR SETTLEMENT CONF
Related Cases
No related cases were found.
Case Event Schedule
Event Date/Time Room Location Judge
PROJECTED SETTLEMENT CONF DATE 02-NOV-2009 09:00 AM City Hall CITY HALL COURTROOM 653 MOSS, SANDRA M
PROJECTED PRE-TRIAL CONF. DATE 07-DEC-2009 09:00 AM City Hall CITY HALL COURTROOM 653 MOSS, SANDRA M
PROJECTED TRIAL DATE 04-JAN-2010 09:00 AM City Hall CITY HALL COURTROOM 653 MOSS, SANDRA M
Case Parties
Seq # Assoc Expn Date Type Name
1 JUDGE DIVITO, GARY
Address: ROOM 229 CITY HALL PHILADELPHIA PA 19107 (215)686-2636 Aliases: none
2 ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF CRISP, JONATHAN W
Address: 3601 VARTAN WAY HARRISBURG PA 17110 Aliases: none
3 DEFENDANT DENG, LILLY
Address: 8 GRANT STREET CAMBRIDGE MA 02138 Aliases: none
4 8 DEFENDANT MCCOBIN, ALEXANDER
Address: 1029 NORTH STUART STREET 300 ARLINGTON VA 22201 Aliases: none
5 2 PLAINTIFF PERSPECTIVES DEBATE INCORPORATED
Address: P.O. BOX 42137 PHILADELPHIA PA 19101 Aliases: none
6 TEAM LEADER MOSS, SANDRA M
Address: 392 CITY HALL PHILADELPHIA PA 19107 (215)686-7910 Aliases: none
7 JUDGE FOX, IDEE C
Address: 656 City Hall PHILADELPHIA PA 19107 (215)686-4222 Aliases: none
8 ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT BOMSTEIN, MICHAEL S
Address: STE.206,BENJ. FRANKLIN HOUSE,834 CHESTNUT ST. PHILADELPHIA PA 19107 (000)592-8383 Aliases: none
Docket Entries
Filing Date/Time Docket Type Filing Party Disposition Amount Approval/Entry Date
12-FEB-2009 02:29 PM ACTIVE CASE 12-FEB-2009 03:08 PM
Docket Entry: E-Filing Number: 0960339
12-FEB-2009 02:29 PM COMMENCEMENT OF CIVIL ACTION CRISP, JONATHAN W 12-FEB-2009 03:08 PM
Docket Entry: none.
12-FEB-2009 02:29 PM COMPLAINT FILED NOTICE GIVEN CRISP, JONATHAN W 12-FEB-2009 03:08 PM
Docket Entry: COMPLAINT WITH NOTICE TO DEFEND WITHIN TWENTY (20) DAYS AFTER SERVICE IN ACCORDANCE WITH RULE 1018.1 FILED.
12-FEB-2009 02:29 PM PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION CRISP, JONATHAN W 12-FEB-2009 03:08 PM
Docket Entry: 80-09024280 PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION/TRO FILED.
17-FEB-2009 08:51 AM WAITING TO LIST CASE MGMT CONF 17-FEB-2009 08:51 AM
Docket Entry: none.
19-FEB-2009 03:26 PM MOTION ASSIGNED 19-FEB-2009 03:26 PM
Docket Entry: 80-09024280 PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION ASSIGNED TO JUDGE: FOX, IDEE C. ON DATE: FEBRUARY 19, 2009
19-FEB-2009 03:26 PM MOTION RESPONSE DATE UPDATED 19-FEB-2009 03:26 PM
Docket Entry: 80-09024280 PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION MOTION RESPONSE DATE UPDATED TO .
24-FEB-2009 11:29 AM RULE TO SHOW CAUSE ENTERED FOX, IDEE C 24-FEB-2009 12:00 AM
Docket Entry: 80-09024280 UPON CONSIDERATION OF THE VERIFIED COMPLAINT IN THIS MATTER AND THE PETITION OF PLAINTIFF FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION, IT IS ORDERED THE DEFENDANT SHOW CAUSE BEFORE THIS COURT ON THE 3RD DAY OF MARCH, 2009 AT 1:30 PM IN COURTROOM 426, CITY HALL, PHILA., PA, WHY A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION PROVIDING THE RELIEF SOUGHT IN THE ACCOMPANYING PETITION SHOULD NOT BE ENTERED; AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT PLAINTIFF SHALL CAUSE A COPY OF THIS RULE, ALONG WITH A COPY OF THE COMPLAINT AND THE AFORESAID PETITION AND ACCOMPANYING PAPERS, TO BE SERVED UPON DFT AT LEAST FIVE DAYS BEFORE THE DATE OF THE HEARING. …BY THE COURT: FOX, J. 2-23-09
24-FEB-2009 11:34 AM MOTION HEARING SCHEDULED 24-FEB-2009 11:34 AM
Docket Entry: none.
26-FEB-2009 12:01 AM NOTICE GIVEN 26-FEB-2009 12:01 AM
Docket Entry: none.
03-MAR-2009 10:33 AM ENTRY OF APPEARANCE FILED BOMSTEIN, MICHAEL S 03-MAR-2009 11:13 AM
Docket Entry: ENTRY OF APPEARANCE OF MICHAEL S BOMSTEIN FILED. (FILED ON BEHALF OF ALEXANDER MCCOBIN)
04-MAR-2009 03:32 PM ORDER ENTERED/236 NOTICE GIVEN FOX, IDEE C 04-MAR-2009 03:32 PM
Docket Entry: 80-09024280 CONSENT DECREE ORDER ENTERED. PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION IS HEREBY GRANTED. SEE ORDER FOR COMPLETE TERMS AND CONDITIONS. BY THE COURT: JUDGE FOX, 3/3/09.
11-MAY-2009 09:44 AM LISTED FOR CASE MGMT CONF 11-MAY-2009 09:44 AM
Docket Entry: none.
13-MAY-2009 12:01 AM NOTICE GIVEN 13-MAY-2009 12:01 AM
Docket Entry: none.
10-JUN-2009 03:33 PM CASE MGMT CONFERENCE COMPLETED SULLIVAN, JOAN 10-JUN-2009 03:33 PM
Docket Entry: none.
10-JUN-2009 03:33 PM CASE MANAGEMENT ORDER ISSUED 10-JUN-2009 03:33 PM
Docket Entry: CASE MANAGEMENT ORDER NON-JURY EXPEDITED TRACK – It is Ordered that: The case management and time standards adopted for non-jury expedited track cases shall apply and are incorporated. All Discovery shall be completed not later than 08-SEP-2009. All Pre trial Motions (other than Motions in Limine) shall be filed not later than 05-OCT-2009. A Settlement Conference may be scheduled at any time after 02-NOV-2009. Fifteen Days prior to that date all parties shall serve on all opposing counsel or pro se parties and file a Settlement Memorandum containing the following: a. The plaintiff(s) shall provide a concise statement of the theory of the case. The defendant(s) and additional defendant(s) shall provide a concise statement as to the nature of the defense. b. A statement by the plaintiff(s) itemizing all damages sought by categories and amount; c. Defendant(s) and additional defendant(s) shall identify all applicable insurance carriers, together with corresponding limits of liability. A Pre trial Conference may be scheduled at any time after 07-DEC-2009. All parties shall file and also serve all opposing counsel or pro se parties the following documents by the due dates indicated: 1. Development of Joint Statement of Uncontested and Contested Facts. (a) Plaintiff’s Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Legal Issues for Trial. By 02-NOV-2009, Plaintiff shall provide the Court with a narrative statement listing all facts proposed to be proved by him or her at trial in support of his or her claim(s) as to liability and damages. Additionally, plaintiff shall provide the Court with all relevant conclusions of law based upon his or her proposed findings of fact and any and all legal issues presented thereto. (b) Defendant’s Response and Proposed Facts. By 07-DEC-2009, Defendant shall provide the Court a statement: (1) indicating the extent to which defendant contests and does not contest the plaintiff’s proposed facts: (2) listing all additional facts proposed to be proved by defendant at trial in opposition to, or in special defense of, the plaintiff’s claim(s) as to liability and damages; (3) listing all facts proposed to be proved by defendant at trial in support of any counterclaim(s), and/or third-party claim(s) if such claims exist; (4) listing any and all conclusions of law which arise from all contested and uncontested facts as proposed by the plaintiff; and, (5) listing for the Court all legal issues presented based upon proposed facts and conclusions of law. (c) Statement of Uncontested Facts. By 02-NOV-2009, the parties shall submit a joint statement of uncontested facts. This statement is separate and distinct from any other submitted. As such, agreement or disagreement, which terms are defined below, with any proposed fact by a defendant does not obviate the requirements of this paragraph. 2. Identification of Witnesses and Exhibits. (a) Plaintiff’s Witnesses. By 02-NOV-2009, plaintiff shall provide the Court with a list of all possible witnesses, including a brief narrative of each respective witness’s expected testimony. (b) Plaintiff’s Exhibits. By 02-NOV-2009, plaintiff shall provide the Court with a list of all possible exhibits which he or she may use during the course of trial. (c) Defendant’s Witnesses. By 07-DEC-2009, defendant shall provide the Court with a list of all possible witnesses, including a brief narrative of each respective witness’s expected testimony. (d) Defendant’s Exhibits. By 07-DEC-2009, defendant shall provide the Court with a list of all possible exhibits which he or she may use during the course of the trial. 3. Definitions. (a) Narration of Proposed Facts. In stating facts proposed to be proved, counsel shall do so in simple, declarative, self contained, consecutively numbered sentences. In a case with multiple parties, if a fact is to offered against fewer than all parties, counsel shall indicate the parties against which the fact will (or will not) be offered. (The facts to be set forth include not only ultimate facts, but also all subsidiary and supporting facts except those offered solely for impeachment purposes.) (b) Agreement and Disagreement. Defense counsel shall indicate that he or she does not contest a proposed fact if at trial they will not controvert or dispute that fact. In indicating disagreement with a proposed fact, defense counsel shall so set forth those disagreement(s) as explained above. (c) Objections. Objections to the admissibility of a proposed fact (either as irrelevant or on other grounds) may not be used to avoid indicating whether or not the party contests the truth of that fact. (Counsel shall, however, indicate any objections, both to the facts which they contest and those which they do not contest.) (d) Individual Positions. To the extent feasible, counsel with similar interests are expected to coordinate their efforts and express a joint position with respect to the facts they propose to prove and to the facts other parties propose to prove. Subject to the time limits above, each party may, however, list additional proposed facts to cover positions unique to it. 4. Annotations. For each proposed fact, the parties shall, at the time of proposing to prove the fact, list the witnesses (including expert witnesses), documents, and (with line-by-line references) any depositions and answers to interrogatories or requests for admissions that they will offer to prove that fact. In his or her response, defense counsel shall, if he or she objects to any such proposed fact or proposed proof, state precisely the grounds of their objections and, if they will contest the accuracy of the proposed fact, similarly list the witnesses, documents, depositions, interrogatories, or admissions that they will offer to controvert that fact. Except for good cause shown, a party will be precluded at trial from offering any evidence on any fact not so disclosed and from making any objection not so disclosed. 5. Effect. Preclusion of other Facts. Except for good cause shown, parties shall be precluded at trial from offering proof of any fact not disclosed in their listing of proposed facts (except purely for impeachment purposes). 6. Sanctions. Unjustified refusal to admit a proposed fact or to limit the extent of disagreement with a proposed fact shall be subject to sanctions. Excessive listing of proposed facts (or of the evidence to be submitted in support of or denial of such facts) which imposes obvious burdens on opposing parties shall also be subject to sanctions. 7. Length of Trial. Each counsel shall provide an estimate of the anticipated length of trial. It is expected that the case will be ready for Trial 04-JAN-2010, which is the earliest trial date pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 212.1, and counsel should anticipate trial to begin expeditiously thereafter. All counsel are under a continuing obligation and are hereby Ordered to serve a copy of this Order upon all unrepresented parties and upon all counsel entering an appearance subsequent to the entry of this Order. …BY THE COURT: SANDRA MOSS, J. 10-JUN-2009
10-JUN-2009 03:33 PM LISTED FOR SETTLEMENT CONF 10-JUN-2009 03:33 PM
Docket Entry: none.
10-JUN-2009 03:33 PM LISTED FOR PRE-TRIAL CONF 10-JUN-2009 03:33 PM
Docket Entry: none.
10-JUN-2009 03:33 PM LISTED FOR TRIAL 10-JUN-2009 03:33 PM
Docket Entry: none.
16-JUL-2009 03:24 PM OTHER EVENT CANCELLED 16-JUL-2009 03:24 PM
Docket Entry: none.
This is interesting, no?
–art kyriazis, philly/south jersey
home of the world champion phillies
WHY THE DEMS DON’T GET IT
June 11, 2009
Unfortunately, in light of recent domestic policy directions, I think the Dems have it all wrong.
Health care reform is an idea left over from 1991. The only reason the Dems want to push it through now is because they have the votes to pass the bills they didn’t get passed in the first session of the first term of the Clinton Presidency.
But is this a good reason to pass a law, because you proposed it before and you’ve been trying to pass it for so long?
Universal Health Care is an idea born of POST-DEPRESSION affluence–it’s a fringe benefit to be offered to a population that’s already employed, that already has a guaranteed vacation, a guaranteed pension, and has guaranteed housing. In short, guaranteed health care is the LAST welfare benefit that should be federalized.
In addition, and this is a revision from my original post, according to a recent article posted in a respected publication, the health uninsured are not universally distributed throughout the United States.
In point of fact, less than 3% of Massachusetts residents lack health insurance, thanks to the state law health care coverage efforts of people like Gov. Mike Dukakis and his successors in office. The fact that Massachusetts has nearly universal health care coverage proves that this is a STATE problem and not a FEDERAL problem.
Looking more nationally, the Midwest and Northeast have fewer than ten per cent uninsured as to health care.
It is the South and the West that have 15-25% health uninsured rates; the highest being the state of Texas.
You don’t have to be a statistics major to know that Texas also is a non-union state, has a large number of illegal immigrant resident aliens, and that these conditions are pretty much true throughout the Sunbelt, where the problem of lack of health care coverage is an issue of non-union shops and illegal immigrants competing for jobs, which drives down the employers’ incentives to provide health care benefits.
Consequently, why is this a federal problem? This seems instead to be either an immigration problem, a union/labor law problem, or a combination of the two (as Janis Joplin and Big Brother used to sing). (She was from Texas, by the way, before she got out the San Francisco).
Moreover, if Texas wants to solve their own problems, why not let them experiment? They’ve already reformed tort law to make it much harder to sue MDs–welcome relief to the medical profession, which has flocked in droves to practice in Texas, now considered a medical mecca.
Obama wants to ruin all this. His health care proposal, according to reports, would result in a massive transfer of wealth from the largely democratic and already overtaxed midwest and northeast, and transfer it to the sunbelt states, the south and west, in order to mainly put on federal health coverage, non-union workers who are scabs (union busters) and illegal immigrants (also scabs and union busters).
Do we really want to spend our tax dollars paying for health benefits for strikebreaking scabs and unionbusting immigrant labor? And for illegal aliens to get health care?
Also, additionally, Obama’s health proposal will cause deep cuts in the current level of medicaid, medicare and drugs provided to the elderly under medicare.
In short, the proposal will triage the old and deprive them of expensive end of life care, and let them die more quickly, in order to provide basic health care to young, healthy labor that is non-union, largely hispanic, and living in the sunbelt.
The demographic implications of this over the long run will be a much younger, more hispanic united States, even more concentrated in the sunbelt than it already is, and will likely lead eventually to a bilingual nation that speaks Spanish and English, as well as to the ultimate downfall of unions, since one of the major arguments for unions is that they provide their members with health care and pension benefits during job and contract negotiations.
If unions are deprived of health care as a benefit to negotiate for, fewer workers will opt into unions. Obama and the democrats, paradoxically, are going to drive the death nail into the coffin of the union movement in this country. They haven’t thought through clearly the implications of what they are doing.
In short, this is a regional problem, and a union/immigration problem, and not a national problem. National mandates for the states would probably fix this, along with a public/private partnership with some insurance companies that could work with some of the southern and western states.
Part II
The REAL problem today is not health care at all.
The real problem today is that people don’t have jobs and they’re losing their houses. We have lawyers, bankers, traders who have blown up, car companies laying off, people all over America losing good jobs. Everywhere you go in this country, houses are for sale or being sold off by the sheriff.
I’ve never seen so many homes for sale in my own neighborhood. Twenty-Two years i’ve lived here, and three houses were a lot to be for sale here; now we have 25 and none are selling. There is a glut on the market where two years ago there was a boom in the market. The bottom has fallen out of the real estate market and no end of the downward spiral is in sight.
People’s equity in their homes, the main source of wealth for most Americans, has vanished, and the federal government has done NOTHING about it.
Except, of course, to bail out the rich fat cat bankers, and appoint a salary czar to oversee their million bazillion dollar bonuses.
Is this for real? Federally funded trickle down? If Reagan had done this, there would have been riots in the streets.
What we need precisely is a sort of FDIC, but instead of guaranteeing your banking deposits against banking failure, you would be guaranteed your home’s equity value, an FDIC for home equity, that will guarantee up to $1,000,000 of value in your home’s equity value against falling home prices, that is either automatic through fannie mae or freddie mac, or that you can purchase as insurance, for a small sum of money.
Now isn’t THAT a SENSIBLE idea?
Second, everyone with negative home equity should be forgiven their loans in excess of 80% of their debt loads immediately, and the banks commanded to write that debt off immediately.
Third, anyone who files for bankruptcy should be able to modify his or her mortgage under sections 1322 of the Code or anywhere else as pertinent, or under a Chapter 11 Plan, and cram it down the bank’s throat against their wishes if the bank’s loan exceed’s 80% of the value of the home and there is a negative equity spiral, the debtor should be able to eliminate all but 80% of the loan.
My point is, what good is free health care if you have no job and no house? It’s like serving gelato to a man who is homeless and has no money and hasn’t eaten in days–health care is like dessert.
Back in the 90s, when everyone had a job, it was ok to talk about health care–it was the LAST thing we needed. But now we’re back to square one–we need to talk about guaranteeing incomes, jobs and housing. We’re back to FDR and Truman and LBJ.
This administration just doesn’t get it.
Paradoxically, I think the right Republican approach might get it and win back the white house if it’s sufficiently populist in nature and goes after the big banks, which the democrats appear to be, pardon the expression, in bed with.
The Democrats need to examine an NRA-style national Jobs Program that will put everyone in the United States to work. Second, the Draft needs to be re-instituted. Kids that are in the army will be employed. Third, we need to nationalize the universities and make education free of charge. Fourth, we need to nationalize the cable companies and make the internet free of charge to the poor and to the rich equally, as well as making basic cable tv a free resource to everyone.
Fifth, for anyone that’s not employed, a Guranteed Annual Income or GAI must be mandated and paid by the Government, along with a negative income tax to avoid work related disincentives. The welfare reform measures of the Clinton era will have to be undone for the time being, because right now, middle class families are starving and in danger of homelessness, and THEY need welfare. The program needs to be federal, and the income level to be guaranteed needs to be large, around $15,000-20,000 annually, and adjusted for children and circumstances.
Sixth, the government has to embark on a massive program of propping up the housing market, investing in public housing, investing in Section 8, expanding the HUD budget, and so forth.
Seventh, we need to start investing in having one spouse stay home and take care of the kids. I know this is controversial, but two wage earners has destroyed many marriages and the american way of life.
Eighth, we need to reform the real estate brokerage business so that commissions from family homes are much less than for commission from commercial real estate. Instead of six points, let brokers earn only one point. This way, brokers won’t churn real estate and people won’t use their homes as profit tools.
Ninth, reform the tax code so that people have to pay MORE income tax on the sale of their primary homes, e.g. remove the exemption entirely, unless they stay in them a minimum of five years, unless they have to move for cause, such as a job-related transfer to another city, or medical reasons. This would stop people from buying and selling homes constantly and churning the market.
Tenth, more closely regulate lenders, brokers and sellers of real estate. Let people buy and sell and profiteer on second homes, commercial real estate and so forth, but those parcels will be taxed, etc.
I think this is the approach we need.
This is what the democrats are ignoring.
They’re going to raise taxes and bring down the house as it were on average joe while they raise up false idols like the bankers.
We badly need a new prophet in the land, and i’m not talking about Rush Limbaugh here.
–art kyriazis, philly/south jersey
home of the world champion philliesght
Cap and Trade – A Horrible Idea – Let’s Abolish Cars and Build a Real Rail System Instead
May 13, 2009
Cap and Trade Is a very bad idea, right now.
First, a history lesson. President Clinton’s first term was a disaster, in large part, because he spent most of his first two years pursuing three very liberal ideas—gays in the military, universal health care, and a federal tax on BTU usage.
These three ideas were, at the time, in 1993-1995, so controversial, that they not only threatened to sink President Clinton after only one term, but resulted in 1994 in the largest shift in a mid-term election in the House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate in United States History.
The House lost more than fifty Democratic seats and went Republican for the first time in a long time; and the Senate also suffered huge democratic losses; all due to Newt Gingrich and the Contract with America, which was a direct and overwhelming refutation of Clinton’s liberal agenda.
Much the same thing happened in the first two years of Jimmy Carter’s term; Carter pardoned all of the draft-dodging Vietnam protesters hiding out in Canada, and virtually declared war on the CIA and all of the US military operations around the world, which led to terror operations and revolutions around the world intensifying, culminating in the Iranianian Revolution and the taking of the U.S. Embassy in Teheran and the holding of 52 U.S. hostages for over a year, a spectacle so embarassing to the United States, repeated night after night on national TV as it was, that virtually every Democrat in office lost his seat by 1980, and the Republicans and Ronald Reagan were swept into power, with a whole new agenda of re-arming America and restoring her lost prestige abroad.
Getting back to Clinton, the BTU Tax was an idea very similar to the current notion of Cap and Trade. Cap and Trade, like the BTU Tax, is essentially a tax on carbon usage. The idea is, if we tax carbon-based fossil fuels enough, and make them costly enough, it will force everyone, including consumers and energy companies, to seek non-carbon based alternatives.
There are three basic problems with cap and trade (actually, there are many more, but I will discuss three here) that make it a bad idea for now. First, we are in a recession that is actually more of a depression. Cap and Trade is a large TAX INCREASE that will suck spending power out of the hands of consumers. Consequently, it will kill the marginal propensity of consumer demand, and attack the very object of the Stimulus Bill.
I don’t have to be a doctor to know, that you don’t give a man a sleeping pill, just when you’ve given him a shot to wake him up, while he’s still groggy and coming around.
Right now, the American economy is like a man who can’t wake up. Cap and Trade would be like a sleeping pill to that man. The Stimulus Bill was like a cup of coffee or a shot of epinephrine—a stimulant to wake him.
Cap and Trade is like a sleeping pill that would suck away his vital energy.
Second, in order to invest in, and build, energy alternatives, there has to be a venture capital and investment banking, and regular banking systems, in place. Today, those systems are impaired, crippled or functioning at about half capacity. Consequently, Cap and Trade can’t work under today’s economic conditions. Consequently, no infrastructure would develop under Cap and Trade to produce renewable energy alternatives until the banking and lending systems come back on line.
All we’ll have is a tax that makes oil and gas and coal more expensive, but no alternatives will develop for many years yet, due to the impairments of the banking, VC and R & D systems.
Third, even if the banking, VC and R & D systems were perfect, there is no energy alternative that could come on line sooner than ten years from today to replace current oil, gas and coal based consumption.
Wind and solar currently provide less than 1% of current energy needs; energy needs keep GROWING at an exponential rate, if you include the third world, and none of the so-called renewable energy forms are anywhere close to being ready to assume more than a micro-share of the energy load, whether we’re talking about wind, solar, geothermal, capturing energy from ocean waves, and so forth.
It’s been fifty plus years since the hydrogen bomb, but no one has yet developed and sustained a fusion reaction that can last and power an energy generating plant. That technology seems as remote as the so-called “WARP” engines on the starship Enterprise on STAR TREK.
That leaves us with one, and only one realistic alternative, and that is nuclear power plants. They are tanned, rested and ready, and the newest generation of nukes have much higher capacity factors and higher safety factors than ever before.
The problem with nukes is, you still need about two billion dollars to build a single plant, about 3-4 years to get the necessary permits to build a plant in the U.S. and another 3-4 years to build the plant and get it on line.
That’s 6-8 years and two billion dollars to get each plant on line, and most of the two billion dollars will have to be absorbed by the consumer in electricity costs. Let’s figure that we build fifty of those plants—that’s a hundred billion dollars in construction costs alone that have to be absorbed back again by means of utility bills to the consumer over the next ten-twenty years. That’s on top of the cap and trade tax costs.
In short, it’s a very expensive proposition to jettison oil, gas and coal.
It’s too bad that the United States didn’t commit to a nukes policy back in 1955, when nuclear power was cheap and we could have covered the US with nuclear power plants for a fraction of the cost of today.
If we had committed to such a policy then, we could have been completely independent of Middle Eastern Oil as of 1970.
Even as late as 1975, we still could have committed to nukes for a fraction of today’s costs, and been independent of Middle Eastern Oil by the 1990s.
However, the wacky left and particularly eco-wacky californians, continuously opposed nuclear power in this country for decades. Nuclear power could have given us full independence from the Middle East a long, long time ago, and spared us these last two wars in Iraq and Kuwait.
The problems we face today are a consequence of our leaders living life as if we can’t shape the future. But we can and must shape the future.
The future is not shaped by dice rolling or by random events. The future is shaped by decisions we make and by policies we need to hew to in order to shape the probabilities and likelihoods of the future outcomes to be.
A responsible United States Government would have made us one hundred percent reliant on nuclear energy for our power production as soon as humanly possible, once we unlocked the secrets of the atom, back in the 1950s.
Our failures to do so may have been the result of many causes, and I won’t speculate here on the role of the oil and gas companies, the so-called, Seven Sisters, and their multinational interests linked to Middle Eastern oil producing states, but clearly nuclear energy would have a lot cheaper over the last sixty years than two wars fought directly by the US in the Middle East, and five wars fought by proxy between Israel and the oil-producing states.
Had we eliminated oil dependence early by committing to the atom, we would have changed history decisively and for the better.
Cap and Trade is not the answer.
A federally-sponsored program of accelerated conversion to Nuclear Powered electric generation, followed by a fifty to one hundred year phase in of solar, wind and fusion power, is the answer.
All electric companies should be abolished in favor of one company modeled and based on the Tennessee Valley Authority, that will erect Nukes until the United States is 100% nuclear based electric power, and zero percent coal or oil.
Combing this with a program of converting all cars to electric power would also solve another problem as well. This is clearly doable in the next five-ten years.
This is the kind of program that would involve spending money on a specific problem, creating jobs, and stimulating the economy. It’s better than cap and trade because it puts dollars into the economy instead of taking them out. Also, it federalizes the utilities, which do a horrible job.
Finally, the electric grid needs to be updated using superconductors and the latest electric technologies, including quantum conductors and new metals to conduct electricity. With superconductors, electricity can be sent from location to location without any loss of power or current. This would eliminate the need for transformers and high voltage lines, etc. Again, a vast federal program committed to upgrading the grid is needed.
These steps would be much better than cap and trade.
A final note about cars–Why do Obama and the Democrats want to prop up the car industry if they are truly worried about Global Warming? Cars contribute more than 50% of the hydrocarbon emissions in the US that contribute to global warming.
Instead of paying consumers a $4,000 tax credit to buy new cars with high gas mileage, wouldn’t it make more sense to get people to STOP DRIVING CARS AND TAKE MASS TRANSIT?
In short,
1) Let the U.S. Auto Industry DIE.
2) Put an enormous carbon tax on all car purchases. Make any new car cost around $50,000 to buy.
3) Apply that tax backwards to used cars as well.
4) Massively subsidize AMTRAK and all local mass transit across the nation, and let people ride the trains and Mass Transit free for the next five years. Yes, I said it, FREE OF CHARGE for the next five years. Why? To get them used to doing it. The massive federal stimulus bill to build rail, subway, light rail throughout the US would be in the TRILLIONS of dollars, as well as to subsidize AMTRAK everywhere so it’s FREE OF CHARGE. That would be a net STIMULUS to the economy and create the world’s finest light and heavy rail systems. We could also finally build HIGH SPEED RAIL SYSTEMS modeled on France, England and Japan to cover longer distances that could go 300-400 miles per hour, that could eliminate many shorter airplane routes, unclogging the skies of needless plane flight. This is a win, win, win plan. We get rid of filthy autos and planes and replace them with electric trains. And net net net create jobs.
5) Starting in 2014, you can slowly re-introduce fees again for Mass Transit and AMTRAK once we’ve started to eliminate all of the automobiles.
6) Start reclaiming the inner cities by closing roads and creating pedestrian zones and mass-transit zones, and creating more and more parks in which no cars can come into the city, until finally, all cities will have no cars or trucks at all.
7) The goal would be to eliminate cars and trucks by 2025, and convert everyone to mass transit and rail.
8) Electric cars only would be allowed eventually, powered by the nuclear grid. These would be cheap and affordable.
This is a far reaching and thoughtful plan. Abolish the internal combustion engine as we know it and force all americans out of their cars and onto trains, buses, subways and light rail.
This is the true path to ending global warming and reaching a green economy.
Art Kyriazis
Philly/South Jersey
Home of the World Champion Phillies
up
THE WORLD’S SHORTEST BOOKS by Mark J. Leonardo, Esquire, Attorney at Law, Malibu, California
May 13, 2009
The World’s Shortest Books:
THINGS I LOVE ABOUT MY COUNTRY
by Oscar Winer Jane Fonda & Cindy Sheehan .
Illustrated by Michael Moore
________________________________________
MY CHRISTIAN ACCOMPLISHMENTS &
HOW I HELPED AFTER KATRINA
by the Revs Jesse Jackson & Al Sharpton
_______________________________________
THINGS I LOVE ABOUT BILL
by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton
________________________________
Sequel:
THINGS I LOVE ABOUT HILLARY
By former President Bill Clinton
___________________________________
MY LITTLE BOOK OF PERSONAL HYGIENE
by Osama Bin Laden
___________________________________
THINGS I CANNOT AFFORD
by Microsoft Chair Emeritus Bill Gates
____________________________________
THINGS I WOULD NOT DO FOR MONEY
by NBA Rebound Champion Dennis Rodman
_________________________________
THINGS I KNOW TO BE TRUE
by Nobel Prize Winner Al Gore & Sen. John Kerry
_______________________________________
AMELIA EARHART’S GUIDE TO THE PACIFIC
___________________________________
A COLLECTION of
MOTIVATIONAL SPEECHES: REASONS TO LOVE LIFE.
by Suicide Doctor Jack Kevorkian
__________________________________
TO ALL THE MEN I HAVE LOVED BEFORE
by Ellen de Generes & Rosie O’Donnell
____________________________________
GUIDE TO DATING ETIQUETTE
by former heavyweight champ Mike Tyson
__________________________________
THE AMISH PHONE DIRECTORY
_______________________________________
MY PLAN TO FIND THE REAL KILLERS
by Former Heisman Winner O.J. Simpson
_________________________________________
HOW TO DRINK & DRIVE OVER BRIDGES
by Senator Ted Kennedy
___________________________________
MY BOOK OF MORALS
by former President Bill Clinton
with introduction by The Rev. Jesse Jackson
*******************************************************
AND, JUST ADDED:
Complete Knowledge of Military Strategy!
By House Majority Leader Nancy Pelosi
Mark J. Leonardo, Esq.
THE LAW OFFICES OF MARK J. LEONARDO, ESQ.
784 Latigo Canyon Road
Malibu, California 90265
(310) 456-7373
(310) 317-7261 (fax)
MARK LEONARDO IS NOT JUST ONE OF THE BEST ATTORNEYS IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA–HE’S ALSO A GREAT PIANO PLAYER, A WONDERFUL FATHER, AND HE’S PERSONAL FRIENDS WITH FELLOW DETROIT NATIVE KID ROCK!!!! (WELL, HE USED TO BE UNTIL THE KID SPLIT UP WITH PAM ANDERSON). MARK IS ONE RIGHT ON DUDE!!! CALL HIM FOR ALL YOUR LEGAL PROBLEMS IN CALI!!!! AND, SINCE HIS OFFICE IS IN MALIBU, YOU CAN GO SURFING AT MALIBU POINT AFTER YOUR BUSINESS MEETING OR JUST HIT THE BEACH AT ZUMA…..
–art kyriazis philly/south jersey
home of the non-steroid using world champion philadelphia phillies
HAPPY EASTER AND PASSOVER TO ALL
April 7, 2009
I wanted to wish a Happy Easter and a Happy Passover to all.
There’s an old joke, that goes something like this. A liberal is arguing with a conservative about the death penalty. Finally, exasperated, the conservative says to the liberal, “of course I’m in favor of the death penalty–without the death penalty, there’d be no Easter and no Easter Bunny!”
While this is an awful joke, it does remain true that in the two major capital punishment trials that we know about in history, Socrates and Jesus, as best we know, both were wrongfully convicted and sentenced to death. I won’t even get to the OJ trial, although as we all know, the glove didn’t fit and they had to acquit.
Obviously Socrates and Jesus could have used Johnny Cochran as their lawyer.
Socrates on dying, was reputed to have said something like, I die, you live, god knows who is going to the better place. Those of us who are religious of course believe that death brings us closer to a better place indeed, but Socrates provides a flash of insight that this short life is not the only one, that there is a spiritual and inner life that transcends death. Religion ministers to the soul, or at least to our conception of the soul, and consequently it is a vital part of our lives.
The Passover story about Moses leading the chosen people out of bondage and out of Egypt is a great story, as well as being an integral part of the old testament. “Exodus” is actually ancient greek for “Exothos” or “Exit” or “Leaving”. It’s the title of the book from the Ancient Greek Septuagint. The entire point of Exodus is the story of the Chosen People Leaving, “Exothos”, from Egypt and their bondage. God frees them from slavery and bondage through Moses and a series of miracles, each one greater than the last, which are celebrated each and every Passover.
It is such an important story because it gives hope to every oppressed peoples that God will redeem every one in bondage, free them and lead them to their own Promised Land. When Martin Luther King spoke of reaching the Promised Land, it was the Passover Story he was referring to. He didn’t need to explain that to his listeners, many of whom were careful Bible readers. The African-Americans of this country understood about bondage, redemption, and being led out of bondage and to the Promised Land.
On this Passover, we should think about these matters in considering President Obama, a man who has the potential to unite many different elements of society, and perhaps finally lead a people to the Promised Land. All oppressed peoples the world over hearken to the story of Exodus.
I’ve always had a strong faith in God and I don’t doubt God’s existence. Recently there’s been a spate of books and articles by respected scholars advocating atheism and the non-existence of God. I find this to be an awful waste of scholarly time, and especially of taxpayer and endowment money. Isn’t there something important these guys should be doing on our nickel?
Richard Dawkins, who once wrote a book called “The Selfish Gene,” is one of these. He used to teach at Harvard, now teaches in England, and appears to enjoy bashing God and religion in his books. Dawkins used to be a capable biologist. In his old age, he’s turned into a menacing crank who hates old ladies who go to church and pray to the saints and God for the memories of their dead husbands.
How mean can you possible get?
You might call him “The Selfish Dean” because he really seems only to care about himself. Is this what tenure breeds? Idiotic books about atheism? Pushed on us by editors and publishing houses?
Belief in God is a personal matter, but it also means a commitment to others, and to doing things for others, without considering the personal benefit to yourself. Sitting around the table at Easter, at Seder, at any family gathering, we give thanks to our creator and Lord for family, for health, for happiness. I can’t imagine a life without God or without prayer, a life without church or without friends from church or the church community.
I’ve looked at Dawkins’ books on atheism. They are poorly written, poorly argued, and basically are rants.
It’s not a careful argument.
A careful argument, for example, would be Aquinas’ Summa Contra Gentiles, or Martin Luther’s 95 Theses against the Catholic Church, or John Calvin’s immense work of theology criticizing the Roman Catholic Church and setting forth the tenets of Calvinism.
Those are careful and thoughtful books, which make their cases carefully, point by point.
Dawkins’ books by contrast are awful and poorly researched and poorly written. It’s embarassing to see a professor publish such awful work. Especially when he was able while younger to write such a good book on biology as “The Selfish Gene.” It’s readily apparent Dawkins’ writing and intellectual skills have sharply declined with age.
But assuming that Dawkins (and any of these other atheists) has/have any rational or reasonable points to make, I’d like to refute them with Pascal’s Wager, for one. I think Dawkins is already refuted by the Transcendental a priori arguments of Kant for God’s existence, but Blaise Pascal made a classic probability argument which is, in fact, irrefutable on mathematical and utility grounds, for God’s existence.
Pascal said you should believe in God, because if you did, even if there was only a 1 in a million chance of his existence, the benefits would be eternal salvation, whereas if you denied Him, the possible harm would be eternal damnation.
Consequently, it’s a lot like the nuclear calculus–the benefits are so great, that even if there’s only a slight chance of God existing, it’s worth going all in on God. If you win, you get eternal salvation forever. (the nukes argument goes like, if there’s a one in a million chance of starting World War III, the harm is so great, you have to avoid it, because it’s nuclear winter and the death of mankind, so the policy can’t be adopted).
If you lose the wager, you burn in hell forever. I kind of envision Dawkins burning in a really hot part of hell, by the way. The part where they keep Bernie Madoff, child molesters, child molesting catholic priests and every single convicted defendant whose story was the real basis for the plot line of a LAW AND ORDER:SVU episode. Those stories are really pretty awful. This is a digression, but it’s hard to believe that’s Jayne Mansfield’s daughter in that show, by the way. Mariska Hargitay, emmy winning actress, now approximately in her mid-40s, and still very beautiful, is the daughter of Mickey Hargitay (a former Mr. Universe) and Jayne Mansfield, the 1950s starlet/sex bomb. I think you’d have to say that Mariska Hargitay has really had a solid acting career.
As for all of those who doubt God’s existence or lack faith in God, I give you an extended discusion of Pascal’s Wager from the Stanford Encylopaedia of Philosophy.
Pascal’s Wager
By Alan Hajek, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
“Pascal’s Wager” is the name given to an argument due to Blaise Pascal for believing, or for at least taking steps to believe, in God. The name is somewhat misleading, for in a single paragraph of his Pensées, Pascal apparently presents at least three such arguments, each of which might be called a ‘wager’ — it is only the final of these that is traditionally referred to as “Pascal’s Wager”. We find in it the extraordinary confluence of several strands in intellectual thought: the justification of theism; probability theory and decision theory, used here for almost the first time in history; pragmatism; voluntarism (the thesis that belief is a matter of the will); and the use of the concept of infinity.
We will begin with some brief stage-setting: some historical background, some of the basics of decision theory, and some of the exegetical problems that the Pensées pose. Then we will follow the text to extract three main arguments. The bulk of the literature addresses the third of these arguments, as will the bulk of our discussion here. Some of the more technical and scholarly aspects of our discussion will be relegated to lengthy footnotes, to which there are links for the interested reader. All quotations are from §233 of Pensées (1910, Trotter translation), the ‘thought’ whose heading is “Infinite—nothing”.
• 1. Background
• 2. The Argument from Superdominance
• 3. The Argument from Expectation
• 4. The Argument from Generalized Expectations: “Pascal’s Wager”
• 5. Objections to Pascal’s Wager
• Bibliography
• Other Internet Resources
• Related Entries
1. Background
It is important to contrast Pascal’s argument with various putative ‘proofs’ of the existence of God that had come before it. Anselm’s ontological argument, Aquinas’ ‘five ways’, Descartes’ ontological and cosmological arguments, and so on, purport to give a priori demonstrations that God exists. Pascal is apparently unimpressed by such attempted justifications of theism: “Endeavour … to convince yourself, not by increase of proofs of God…” Indeed, he concedes that “we do not know if He is …”. Pascal’s project, then, is radically different: he seeks to provide prudential reasons for believing in God. To put it crudely, we should wager that God exists because it is the best bet. Ryan 1994 finds precursors to this line of reasoning in the writings of Plato, Arnobius, Lactantius, and others; we might add Ghazali to his list — see Palacios 1920. But what is distinctive is Pascal’s explicitly decision theoretic formulation of the reasoning. In fact, Hacking 1975 describes the Wager as “the first well-understood contribution to decision theory” (viii). Thus, we should pause briefly to review some of the basics of that theory.
In any decision problem, the way the world is, and what an agent does, together determine an outcome for the agent. We may assign utilities to such outcomes, numbers that represent the degree to which the agent values them. It is typical to present these numbers in a decision matrix, with the columns corresponding to the various relevant states of the world, and the rows corresponding to the various possible actions that the agent can perform.
In decisions under uncertainty, nothing more is given — in particular, the agent does not assign subjective probabilities to the states of the world. Still, sometimes rationality dictates a unique decision nonetheless. Consider, for example, a case that will be particularly relevant here. Suppose that you have two possible actions, A1 and A2, and the worst outcome associated with A1 is at least as good as the best outcome associated with A2; suppose also that in at least one state of the world, A1′s outcome is strictly better than A2′s. Let us say in that case that A1 superdominates A2. Then rationality surely requires you to perform A1.
In decisions under risk, the agent assigns subjective probabilities to the various states of the world. Assume that the states of the world are independent of what the agent does. A figure of merit called the expected utility, or the expectation of a given action can be calculated by a simple formula: for each state, multiply the utility that the action produces in that state by the state’s probability; then, add these numbers. According to decision theory, rationality requires you to perform the action of maximum expected utility (if there is one).
Example. Suppose that the utility of money is linear in number of dollars: you value money at exactly its face value. Suppose that you have the option of paying a dollar to play a game in which there is an equal chance of returning nothing, and returning three dollars. The expectation of the game itself is
0*(1/2) + 3*(1/2) = 1.5,
so the expectation of paying a dollar for certain, then playing, is
-1 + 1.5 = 0.5.
This exceeds the expectation of not playing (namely 0), so you should play. On the other hand, if the game gave an equal chance of returning nothing, and returning two dollars, then its expectation would be:
0*(1/2) + 2*(1/2) = 1.
Then consistent with decision theory, you could either pay the dollar to play, or refuse to
play, for either way your overall expectation would be 0.
Considerations such as these will play a crucial role in Pascal’s arguments. It should be admitted that there are certain exegetical problems in presenting these arguments. Pascal never finished the Pensées, but rather left them in the form of notes of various sizes pinned together. Hacking 1972 describes the “Infinite—nothing” as consisting of “two pieces of paper covered on both sides by handwriting going in all directions, full of erasures, corrections, insertions, and afterthoughts” (24).[1] This may explain why certain passages are notoriously difficult to interpret, as we will see. Furthermore, our formulation of the arguments in the parlance of modern Bayesian decision theory might appear somewhat anachronistic. For example, Pascal did not distinguish between what we would now call objective and subjective probability, although it is clear that it is the latter that is relevant to his arguments. To some extent, “Pascal’s Wager” now has a life of its own, and our presentation of it here is perfectly standard. Still, we will closely follow Pascal’s text, supporting our reading of his arguments as much as possible.
There is the further problem of dividing the Infinite-nothing into separate arguments. We will locate three arguments that each conclude that rationality requires you to wager for God, although they interleave in the text.[2] Finally, there is some disagreement over just what “wagering for God” involves — is it believing in God, or merely trying to? We will conclude with a discussion of what Pascal meant by this.
2. The Argument from Superdominance
Pascal maintains that we are incapable of knowing whether God exists or not, yet we must “wager” one way or the other. Reason cannot settle which way we should incline, but a consideration of the relevant outcomes supposedly can. Here is the first key passage:
“God is, or He is not.”
But to which side shall we incline? Reason can decide nothing here. There is an infinite chaos which separated us. A game is being played at the extremity of this infinite distance where heads or tails will turn up… Which will you choose then? Let us see. Since you must choose, let us see which interests you least. You have two things to lose, the true and the good; and two things to stake, your reason and your will, you knowledge and your happiness; and your nature has two things to shun, error and misery. Your reason is no more shocked in choosing one rather than the other, since you must of necessity choose… But your happiness? Let us weigh the gain and the loss in wagering that God is… If you gain, you gain all; if you lose, you lose nothing. Wager, then, without hesitation that He is.
There are exegetical problems already here, partly because Pascal appears to contradict himself. He speaks of “the true” as something that you can “lose”, and “error” as something “to shun”. Yet he goes on to claim that if you lose the wager that God is, then “you lose nothing”. Surely in that case you “lose the true”, which is just to say that you have made an error. Pascal believes, of course, that the existence of God is “the true” — but that is not something that he can appeal to in this argument. Moreover, it is not because “you must of necessity choose” that “your reason is no more shocked in choosing one rather than the other”. Rather, by Pascal’s own account, it is because “[r]eason can decide nothing here”. (If it could, then it might well be shocked — namely, if you chose in a way contrary to it.)
Following McClennen 1994, Pascal’s argument seems to be best captured as presenting the following decision matrix:
God exists God does not exist
Wager for God Gain all Status quo
Wager against God Misery Status quo
Wagering for God superdominates wagering against God: the worst outcome associated with wagering for God (status quo) is at least as good as the best outcome associated with wagering against God (status quo); and if God exists, the result of wagering for God is strictly better that the result of wagering against God.
(The fact that the result is much better does not matter yet.) Pascal draws the conclusion at this point that rationality requires you to wager for God.
Without any assumption about your probability assignment to God’s existence, the argument is invalid. Rationality does not require you to wager for God if you assign probability 0 to God existing. And Pascal does not explicitly rule this possibility out until a later passage, when he assumes that you assign positive probability to God’s existence; yet this argument is presented as if it is self-contained. His claim that “[r]eason can decide nothing here” may suggest that Pascal regards this as a decision under uncertainty, which is to assume that you do not assign probability at all to God’s existence. If that is a further premise, then the argument is valid; but that premise contradicts his subsequent assumption that you assign positive probability. See McClennen for a reading of this argument as a decision under uncertainty.
Pascal appears to be aware of a further objection to this argument, for he immediately imagines an opponent replying:
“That is very fine. Yes, I must wager; but I may perhaps wager too much.”
The thought seems to be that if I wager for God, and God does not exist, then I really do lose something. In fact, Pascal himself speaks of staking something when one wagers for God, which presumably one loses if God does not exist. (We have already mentioned ‘the true’ as one such thing; Pascal also seems to regard one’s worldly life as another.) In other words, the matrix is mistaken in presenting the two outcomes under ‘God does not exist’ as if they were the same, and we do not have a case of superdominance after all.
Pascal addresses this at once in his second argument, which we will discuss only briefly, as it can be thought of as just a prelude to the main argument.
3. The Argument From Expectation
He continues:
Let us see. Since there is an equal risk of gain and of loss, if you had only to gain two lives, instead of one, you might still wager. But if there were three lives to gain, you would have to play (since you are under the necessity of playing), and you would be imprudent, when you are forced to play, not to chance your life to gain three at a game where there is an equal risk of loss and gain. But there is an eternity of life and happiness.
His hypothetically speaking of “two lives” and “three lives” may strike one as odd. It is helpful to bear in mind Pascal’s interest in gambling (which after all provided the initial motivation for his study of probability) and to take the gambling model quite seriously here. Recall our calculation of the expectations of the two dollar and three dollar gambles. Pascal apparently assumes now that utility is linear in number of lives, that wagering for God costs “one life”, and then reasons analogously to the way we did! This is, as it were, a warm-up. Since wagering for God is rationally required even in the hypothetical case in which one of the prizes is three lives, then all the more it is rationally required in the actual case, in which one of the prizes is eternal life (salvation).
So Pascal has now made two striking assumptions:
(1) The probability of God’s existence is 1/2.
(2) Wagering for God brings infinite reward if God exists.
Morris 1994 is sympathetic to (1), while Hacking 1972 finds it “a monstrous premiss”. It apparently derives from the classical interpretation of probability, according to which all possibilities are given equal weight. Of course, unless more is said, the interpretation yields implausible, and even contradictory results. (You have a one-in-a-million chance of winning the lottery; but either you win the lottery or you don’t, so each of these possibilities has probability 1/2?!) Pascal’s best argument for (1) is presumably that “[r]eason can decide nothing here”. (In the lottery ticket case, reason can decide something.) But it is not clear that complete ignorance should be modeled as sharp indifference. In any case, it is clear that there are people in Pascal’s audience who do not assign probability 1/2 to God’s existence. This argument, then, does not speak to them.
However, Pascal realizes that the value of 1/2 actually plays no real role in the argument, thanks to (2). This brings us to the third, and by far the most important, of his arguments.
4. The Argument From Generalized Expectations: “Pascal’s Wager”
We continue the quotation.
But there is an eternity of life and happiness. And this being so, if there were an infinity of chances, of which one only would be for you, you would still be right in wagering one to win two, and you would act stupidly, being obliged to play, by refusing to stake one life against three at a game in which out of an infinity of chances there is one for you, if there were an infinity of an infinitely happy life to gain. But there is here an infinity of an infinitely happy life to gain, a chance of gain against a finite number of chances of loss, and what you stake is finite. It is all divided; wherever the infinite is and there is not an infinity of chances of loss against that of gain, there is no time to hesitate, you must give all…
Again this passage is difficult to understand completely. Pascal’s talk of winning two, or three, lives is at best misleading. By his own decision theoretic lights, you would not act stupidly “by refusing to stake one life against three at a game in which out of an infinity of chances there is one for you”—in fact, you should not stake more than an infinitesimal amount in that case (an amount that is bigger than 0, but smaller than every positive real number). The point, rather, is that the prospective prize is “an infinity of an infinitely happy life”.
In short, if God exists, then wagering for God results in infinite utility.
What about the utilities for the other possible outcomes? There is some dispute over the utility of “misery”. Hacking interprets this as “damnation”, and Pascal does later speak of “hell” as the outcome in this case. Martin 1983 among others assigns this a value of negative infinity. Sobel 1996, on the other hand, is one author who takes this value to be finite. There is some textual support for this reading: “The justice of God must be vast like His compassion. Now justice to the outcast is less vast … than mercy towards the elect”.
As for the utilities of the outcomes associated with God’s non-existence, Pascal tells us that “what you stake is finite”. This suggests that whatever these values are, they are finite.
Pascal’s guiding insight is that the argument from expectation goes through equally well whatever your probability for God’s existence is, provided that it is non-zero and finite (non-infinitesimal) — “a chance of gain against a finite number of chances of loss”.[3]
With Pascal’s assumptions about utilities and probabilities in place, he is now in a position to calculate the relevant expectations. He explains how the calculations should proceed:
… the uncertainty of the gain is proportioned to the certainty of the stake according to the proportion of the chances of gain and loss… [4]
Let us now gather together all of these points into a single argument. We can think of Pascal’s Wager as having three premises: the first concerns the decision matrix of rewards, the second concerns the probability that you should give to God’s existence, and the third is a maxim about rational decision-making. Specifically:
1. Either God exists or God does not exist, and you can either wager for God or wager against God. The utilities of the relevant possible outcomes are as follows, where f1, f2, and f3 are numbers whose values are not specified beyond the requirement that they be finite:
God exists God does not exist
Wager for God ∞ f1
Wager against God f2 f3
2. Rationality requires the probability that you assign to God existing to be positive, and not infinitesimal.
3. Rationality requires you to perform the act of maximum expected utility (when there is one).
4. Conclusion 1. Rationality requires you to wager for God.
5. Conclusion 2. You should wager for God.
We have a decision under risk, with probabilities assigned to the relevant ways the world could be, and utilities assigned to the relevant outcomes. The conclusion seems straightforwardly to follow from the usual calculations of expected utility (where p is your positive, non-infinitesimal probability for God’s existence):
E(wager for God) = ∞*p + f1*(1 − p) = ∞
That is, your expected utility of belief in God is infinite as Pascal puts it, “our proposition is of infinite force”. On the other hand, your expected utility of wagering against God is
E(wager against God) = f2*p + f3*(1 − p)
This is finite.[5] By premise 3, rationality requires you to perform the act of maximum expected utility.
Therefore, rationality requires you to wager for God.
We now survey some of the main objections to the argument.
5. Objections to Pascal’s Wager
Premise 1: The Decision Matrix
Here the objections are manifold. Most of them can be stated quickly, but we will give special attention to what has generally been regarded as the most important of them, ‘the many Gods objection’ (see also the link to footnote 7).
1. Different matrices for different people.
The argument assumes that the same decision matrix applies to everybody. However, perhaps the relevant rewards are different for different people. Perhaps, for example, there is a predestined infinite reward for the Chosen, whatever they do, and finite utility for the rest, as Mackie 1982 suggests. Or maybe the prospect of salvation appeals more to some people than to others, as Swinburne 1969 has noted.
Even granting that a single 2 x 2 matrix applies to everybody, one might dispute the values that enter into it. This brings us to the next two objections.
2. The utility of salvation could not be infinite.
One might argue that the very notion of infinite utility is suspect — see for example Jeffrey 1983 and McClennen 1994.[6] Hence, the objection continues, whatever the utility of salvation might be, it must be finite. Strict finitists, who are chary of the notion of infinity in general, will agree — see Dummett 1978 and Wright 1987. Or perhaps the notion of infinite utility makes sense, but an infinite reward could only be finitely appreciated by a human being.
3. There should be more than one infinity in the matrix.
There are also critics of the Wager who, far from objecting to infinite utilities, want to see more of them in the matrix. For example, it might be thought that a forgiving God would bestow infinite utility upon wagerers-for and wagerers-against alike — Rescher 1985 is one author who entertains this possibility. Or it might be thought that, on the contrary, wagering against an existent God results in negative infinite utility. (As we have noted, some authors read Pascal himself as saying as much.) Either way, f2 is not really finite at all, but ∞ or -∞ as the case may be. And perhaps f1 and f3 could be ∞ or -∞. Suppose, for instance, that God does not exist, but that we are reincarnated ad infinitum, and that the total utility we receive is an infinite sum that does not converge.
4. The matrix should have more rows.
Perhaps there is more than one way to wager for God, and the rewards that God bestows vary accordingly. For instance, God might not reward infinitely those who strive to believe in Him only for the very mercenary reasons that Pascal gives, as James 1956 has observed. One could also imagine distinguishing belief based on faith from belief based on evidential reasons, and posit different rewards in each case.
6. The matrix should have more columns: the many Gods objection.
If Pascal is really right that reason can decide nothing here, then it would seem that various other theistic hypotheses are also live options. Pascal presumably had in mind the Catholic conception of God — let us suppose that this is the God who either ‘exists’ or ‘does not exist’. By excluded middle, this is a partition. The objection, then, is that the partition is not sufficiently fine-grained, and the ‘(Catholic) God does not exist’ column really subdivides into various other theistic hypotheses. The objection could equally run that Pascal’s argument ‘proves too much’: by parallel reasoning we can ‘show’ that rationality requires believing in various incompatible theistic hypotheses. As Diderot 1875-77 puts the point: “An Imam could reason just as well this way”.[7]
Since then, the point has been represented and refined in various ways. Mackie 1982 writes, “the church within which alone salvation is to be found is not necessarily the Church of Rome, but perhaps that of the Anabaptists or the Mormons or the Muslim Sunnis or the worshippers of Kali or of Odin” (203). Cargile 1966 shows just how easy it is to multiply theistic hypotheses: for each real number x, consider the God who prefers contemplating x more than any other activity. It seems, then, that such ‘alternative gods’ are a dime a dozen — or aleph one, for that matter.
Premise 2: The Probability Assigned to God’s Existence
There are four sorts of problem for this premise. The first two are straightforward; the second two are more technical, and can be found by following the link to footnote 8.
1. Undefined probability for God’s existence. Premise 1 presupposes that you should have a probability for God’s existence in the first place. However, perhaps you could rationally fail to assign it a probability — your probability that God exists could remain undefined. We cannot enter here into the thorny issues concerning the attribution of probabilities to agents. But there is some support for this response even in Pascal’s own text, again at the pivotal claim that “[r]eason can decide nothing here. There is an infinite chaos which separated us. A game is being played at the extremity of this infinite distance where heads or tails will turn up…” The thought could be that any probability assignment is inconsistent with a state of “epistemic nullity” (in Morris’ 1986 phrase): to assign a probability at all — even 1/2 — to God’s existence is to feign having evidence that one in fact totally lacks. For unlike a coin that we know to be fair, this metaphorical ‘coin’ is ‘infinitely far’ from us, hence apparently completely unknown to us. Perhaps, then, rationality actually requires us to refrain from assigning a probability to God’s existence (in which case at least the Argument from Superdominance would be valid). Or perhaps rationality does not require it, but at least permits it. Either way, the Wager would not even get off the ground.
2. Zero probability for God’s existence. Strict atheists may insist on the rationality of a probability assignment of 0, as Oppy 1990 among others points out. For example, they may contend that reason alone can settle that God does not exist, perhaps by arguing that the very notion of an omniscient, omnipotent, omnibenevolent being is contradictory. Or a Bayesian might hold that rationality places no constraint on probabilistic judgments beyond coherence (or conformity to the probability calculus). Then as long as the strict atheist assigns probability 1 to God’s non-existence alongside his or her assignment of 0 to God’s existence, no norm of rationality has been violated.
Furthermore, an assignment of p = 0 would clearly block the route to Pascal’s conclusion. For then the expectation calculations become:
E(wager for God) = ∞*0 + f1*(1 − 0) = f1
E(wager against God) = f2*0 + f3*(1 − 0) = f3
And nothing in the argument implies that f1 > f3. (Indeed, this inequality is questionable, as even Pascal seems to allow.) In short, Pascal’s wager has no pull on strict atheists.[8]
Premise 3: Rationality Requires Maximizing Expected Etility
Finally, one could question Pascal’s decision theoretic assumption that rationality requires one to perform the act of maximum expected utility (when there is one). Now perhaps this is an analytic truth, in which case we could grant it to Pascal without further discussion — perhaps it is constitutive of rationality to maximize expectation, as some might say. But this premise has met serious objections. The Allais 1953 and Ellsberg 1961 paradoxes, for example, are said to show that maximizing expectation can lead one to perform intuitively sub-optimal actions. So too the St. Petersburg paradox, in which it is supposedly absurd that one should be prepared to pay any finite amount to play a game with infinite expectation. (That paradox is particularly apposite here.)[9]
Finally, one might distinguish between practical rationality and theoretical rationality. One could then concede that practical rationality requires you to maximize expected utility, while insisting that theoretical rationality might require something else of you — say, proportioning belief to the amount of evidence available. This objection is especially relevant, since Pascal admits that perhaps you “must renounce reason” in order to follow his advice. But when these two sides of rationality pull in opposite directions, as they apparently can here, it is not obvious that practical rationality should take precedence. (For a discussion of pragmatic, as opposed to theoretical, reasons for belief, see Foley 1994.)
Is the Argument Valid?
A number of authors who have been otherwise critical of the Wager have explicitly conceded that the Wager is valid — e.g. Mackie 1982, Rescher 1985, Mougin and Sober 1994, and most emphatically, Hacking 1972. That is, these authors agree with Pascal that wagering for God really is rationally mandated by Pascal’s decision matrix in tandem with positive probability for God’s existence, and the decision theoretic account of rational action.
However, Duff 1986 and Hájek 2001 argue that the argument is in fact invalid. Their point is that there are strategies besides wagering for God that also have infinite expectation — namely, mixed strategies, whereby you do not wager for or against God outright, but rather choose which of these actions to perform on the basis of the outcome of some chance device. Consider the mixed strategy: “Toss a fair coin: heads, you wager for God; tails, you wager against God”. By Pascal’s lights, with probability 1/2 your expectation will be infinite, and with probability 1/2 it will be finite. The expectation of the entire strategy is:
1/2*∞ + 1/2[f2*p + f3*(1 − p)] = ∞
That is, the coin toss strategy has the same expectation as outright wagering for God. But the probability 1/2 was incidental to the result. Any mixed strategy that gives positive and finite probability to wagering for God will likewise have infinite expectation: “wager for God iff a fair die lands 6″, “wager for God iff your lottery ticket wins”, “wager for God iff a meteor quantum tunnels its way through the side of your house”, and so on.
The problem is still worse than this, though, for there is a sense in which anything that you do might be regarded as a mixed strategy between wagering for God, and wagering against God, with suitable probability weights given to each. Suppose that you choose to ignore the Wager, and to go and have a hamburger instead. Still, you may well assign positive and finite probability to your winding up wagering for God nonetheless; and this probability multiplied by infinity again gives infinity. So ignoring the Wager and having a hamburger has the same expectation as outright wagering for God. Even worse, suppose that you focus all your energy into avoiding belief in God. Still, you may well assign positive and finite probability to your efforts failing, with the result that you wager for God nonetheless. In that case again, your expectation is infinite again. So even if rationality requires you to perform the act of maximum expected utility when there is one, here there isn’t one. Rather, there is a many-way tie for first place, as it were.[10]
Moral Objections to Wagering for God
Let us grant Pascal’s conclusion for the sake of the argument: rationality requires you to wager for God. It still does not obviously follow that you should wager for God. All that we have granted is that one norm — the norm of rationality — prescribes wagering for God. For all that has been said, some other norm might prescribe wagering against God. And unless we can show that the rationality norm trumps the others, we have not settled what we should actually do.
There are several arguments to the effect that morality requires you to wager against God. Pascal himself appears to be aware of one such argument. He admits that if you do not believe in God, his recommended course of action will “deaden your acuteness.” One way of putting the argument is that wagering for God may require you to corrupt yourself, thus violating a Kantian duty to yourself. Clifford 1986 argues that an individual’s believing something on insufficient evidence harms society by promoting credulity. Penelhum 1971 contends that the putative divine plan is itself immoral, condemning as it does honest non-believers to loss of eternal happiness, when such unbelief is in no way culpable; and that to adopt the relevant belief is to be complicit to this immoral plan. See Quinn 1994 for replies to these arguments. For example, against Penelhum he argues that as long as God treats non-believers justly, there is nothing immoral about him bestowing special favor on believers, more perhaps than they deserve. (Note, however, that Pascal leaves open in the Wager whether the payoff for non-believers is just, even though as far as his argument goes, it may be extremely poor.)
Finally, Voltaire protests that there is something unseemly about the whole Wager. He suggests that Pascal’s calculations, and his appeal to self-interest, are unworthy of the gravity of the subject of theistic belief. This does not so much support wagering against God, as dismissing all talk of ‘wagerings’ altogether.
What Does It Mean to “Wager for God”?
Let us now grant Pascal that, all things considered (rationality and morality included), you should wager for God. What exactly does this involve?
A number of authors read Pascal as arguing that you should believe in God — see e.g. Quinn 1994, and Jordan 1994a. But perhaps one cannot simply believe in God at will; and rationality cannot require the impossible. Pascal is well aware of this objection: “[I] am so made that I cannot believe. What, then, would you have me do?”, says his imaginary interlocutor. However, he contends that one can take steps to cultivate such belief:
You would like to attain faith, and do not know the way; you would like to cure yourself of unbelief, and ask the remedy for it. Learn of those who have been bound like you, and who now stake all their possessions. These are people who know the way which you would follow, and who are cured of an ill of which you would be cured. Follow the way by which they began; by acting as if they believed, taking the holy water, having masses said, etc…
But to show you that this leads you there, it is this which will lessen the passions, which are your stumbling-blocks.
We find two main pieces of advice to the non-believer here: act like a believer, and suppress those passions that are obstacles to becoming a believer. And these are actions that one can perform at will.
Believing in God is presumably one way to wager for God. This passage suggests that even the non-believer can wager for God, by striving to become a believer. Critics may question the psychology of belief formation that Pascal presupposes, pointing out that one could strive to believe (perhaps by following exactly Pascal’s prescription), yet fail. To this, a follower of Pascal might reply that the act of genuine striving already displays a pureness of heart that God would fully reward; or even that genuine striving in this case is itself a form of believing.
Pascal’s Wager vies with Anselm’s Ontological Argument for being the most famous argument in the philosophy of religion. As we have seen, it is also a great deal more besides.
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• Vallentyne, Peter. 1995. “Infinite Utility: Anonymity and Person-Centredness”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73: 413-420.
• Vallentyne, Peter and Shelly Kagan. 1997. “Infinite Value and Finitely Additive Value Theory”, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. XCIV, 1: 5-27
• Van Liedekerke, Luc. 1995. “Should Utilitarians Be Cautious About an Infinite Future?”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 73, No. 3, 405-407.
• Weirich, Paul. 1984. “The St. Petersburg Gamble and Risk”, Theory and Decision 17: 193-202.
• Wright, Crispin. 1987. “Strict Finitism”, in Realism, Meaning and Truth, Blackwell.
Copyright © 1998, 2001
Alan Hájek
ahajek@hss.caltech.edu
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
See also, Stephen R. Welch’s page on Pascal’s Wager
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